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50. Airgram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ A-60 Tehran, August 6, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Eliot; coordinated with [text not declassified], First Secretary John A. Armitage; and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Dhahran, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. SUBJECT REF /2/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 2 IRAN) Note: In order that reports of this series may be considered also in connection with the Department's review of our forthcoming Progress Report on the Internal Defense Plan, we have used August 1 as the vantage point from which to survey the political situation in Iran. Therefore, insofar as the present report also contains a semi-annual review of events, it covers the seven-month period from January 1 to August 1. Unless a faster pace of events makes another cut-off date appear more useful for such an assessment, we hope to furnish the next report in this series six months from now, on February 1, 1965. 1. Summary. The only important trend that emerges from our assessment is the gradual deterioration of Iran-Arab relations, and especially of relations with Iraq, since the time of our last report in this series. This is now clearly the problem of principal concern to the Shah. Relations with the U.S. are excellent, probably in good part due to our forthcoming attitude toward the Shah's military concerns, which are now primarily related to the Arab claims to Khuzistan. The internal security situation is good, and the regime's control as tight as ever. The economic situation is on balance slightly worse because of the poor crop situation, although business activity is up; but private investment has not revived and real wages for urban workers are probably down. The Mansur Government appears to be a definite improvement over its predecessor, both in respect to the leadership provided by the Prime Minister and in respect to substantive administrative improvements. The Parliament has not increased in political importance. The reform program has made no particular progress. The New Iran Party is displaying some forward movement and seems to become an asset to the regime. The opposition's capacity for making trouble has probably further declined, and this is also true of the mullahs. Some minor changes have occurred in the "pecking order", but the Shah of course still determines everyone's status. The tribal situation is definitely better in the south, and under control in the west. The slow trend "normalization" of relations with the USSR continues. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] [Here follows the body of the paper.] For the Ambassador: Counselor of Embassy
51. Airgram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ A-139 Tehran, September 22, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 IRAN. Confidential; Noforn. Drafted by Political Officer Victor Wolf, Jr., on September 21. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Jidda, Karachi, and Kuwait. SUBJECT REF Embtel 278/2/ /2/Dated September 10. (Ibid.) It now appears that Ayatollah Khomeini's speech of September 9 (NIT-6533)/3/ did not include any statement supporting the Mansur Government. The only relatively positive feature of the speech is that, while it criticizes the Iranian regime on numerous counts, it does so somewhat less violently than usual for this dissident clerical leader. /3/Not printed. According to more reliable information [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], the September 9 speech blamed "world colonialism" for the divisions between Shia and Sunni, and "the West" for differences between Iranians and Arabs and other Moslems. Khomeini termed the RCD a specific instance of such foreign-inspired division among Moslems (although he did not cite the RCD by name). He inveighed against Israeli and Jewish influence in Iran, complained against lack of freedom of public expression for the religious leaders, and took an oblique swipe at the New Iran Party. [1 line of source text not declassified]/3/ On the whole, qualified observers feel that even though Khomeini continues to remonstrate against the regime and its policies, there has been a slight toning-down in his position. SAVAK believes the religious situation does not for the moment constitute a serious problem for the security authorities. It is possible that a judicious mix of bribery, conciliatory tactics and the ever-present threat of the regime's mailed fist, has had the effect of lessening somewhat the virulence of Khomeini's opposition--although, as his latest speech is now more reliably reported, he is very far indeed from calling for support of the government. For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
52. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, October 14, 1964, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-3 IRAN-US. Confidential; Priority. 404. Embtel 398./2/ Majlis yesterday passed Vienna Convention and status bill re U.S. military personnel,/3/ by vote 74 to 61. Disappointingly, slim margin was due to number of factors as analyzed below, but what stands out is that New Iran Party leadership lost control over substantial number of its own followers. /2/Dated October 12. (Ibid.) /3/In March 1962 the U.S. Government had proposed that U.S. military personnel and civilian employees of the Defense Department stationed in Iran and their dependents should have the privileges and immunities specified for "members of the administrative and technical staff" in the Vienna Convention, i.e., full diplomatic immunity. See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVII, pp. 519-520. Additional documentation relating to the Vienna Convention and status of forces bill is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-3 IRAN-U.S. There are presently 188 deputies in Majlis, of which 138 are New Iran Party members. Some 50 New Iran Party deputies seem to have been absent, and of those present we estimate at least 12 must have voted against government. This became easier for them when opposition was successful in forcing secret vote, which is highly unusual but can be obtained under Majlis regulations if 15 deputies ask for it. Sequence of events and factors entering into the vote were as follows: 1. Monday's New Iran Party caucus (reftel) seemingly went so well that Mansur, Yeganeh and Ziai decided to speed up schedule and bring both bills to vote Tuesday. That party leadership was obviously over-confident is shown by fact that majority made no special effort to round up its supporters to secure maximum attendance. (It is difficult to know how many absented themselves deliberately, but certainly not all absent New Iran Party deputies were busy elsewhere.) Mardom and Independents, who make up "opposition", were practically all present. 2. From beginning of debate, PriMin was on the defensive. While Majlis contacts say they admired his composure under fire, Mansur apparently thought he was dealing only with usual "opposition" which could be steamrollered by New Iran Party majority. Fact that government was abandoned by some of its own supporters (either by adverse vote or deliberate absence) came as rude shock after outcome of vote was announced. Before the vote Ziai had told us New Iran Party expected only two or three defections. 3. Government made long and comprehensive statement about purport of bill, and Mansur offered repeated interpretations in course of debate. Since these may constitute important legislative history, we will submit separate analysis as soon as full record of debate available. Apparently government was forthright in explaining scope and status of bill and did not hedge in its explanations. 4. Opposition either did not get the word that Shah wanted status bill passed, or else it had license to attack government. In any case Mardom and Independents pulled out all the stops, especially after they were voted down in succession of procedural maneuvers designed to delay vote. Government apparently felt (erroneously) that if opposition did not want bill to be brought to vote, it must be weak. 5. What did not help at all is that yesterday's press reported automobile accident in Tehran in which a US serviceman gravely injured an Iranian taxi driver. Some speakers claimed that status bill would wipe out civil liability in such cases. Among the more scurrilous arguments heard was that, "if status bill was passed, an American non-com could henceforth slap the face of an Iranian General with impunity." Most violent speakers against status bill were deputies Zahtab-Fard and Sartip-Pur. Both independents; but many others also talked against, including Mardom group leader Rambod. 6. With Majlis Speaker Riazi in the US, presiding officer was Shafi-Amin who is unskilled in parliamentary tactics and was weak in controlling debate. (Senate President Sharif-Emami, a seasoned parliamentary strategist, commented to us last night that in similar situation he would have called secret session to "blow off steam" before permitting debate to proceed on the record.) 7. There were clearly anti-American themes employed by some of opposition speakers, some of them quite ridiculous (such as insinuation that PriMin must be an American puppet because he had once rented a house to U.S. Embassy officer who was alleged to be "running the government"). Government seems to have suffered this in silence. There were no enthusiastic supporters of status bill. All the emotion was on the other side. In conclusion, we find that while it is heartening that long drawnout question of status of US military personnel in Iran is now settled in parliament, not only Mansur but to some extent also the Shah's regime has paid an unexpectedly high price in getting this done. That price was due in large measure to ineptitude of government's handling both in upper and lower house, but it would be idle to minimize the Nationalist reaction which passage of the bill called forth. It will take several days to assess whether this is a temporary phenomenon that will blow over, as now seems likely, or whether it will have some longer-lasting effects on our relations with Iran. Rockwell
53. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Bracken) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan)/1/ Washington, October 22, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IRN Files: Lot 69 D 513, Iran, 1964, AID 15, PL 480 Food for Peace Program. Confidential. Drafted by Tiger and cleared by Deputy Assist-ant Administrator of the AID Office of Material Resources John W. Johnston, Jr. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "JDJ saw Ioanes 2:30--10/28/64." A memorandum of conversation recording the meeting is ibid.: Lot 69 D 30, Memoranda of Conversation. SUBJECT Our current experience with USDA in its handling of PL-480 programs for Iran has raised so many troublesome problems that we suggest you schedule a meeting with Mr. Raymond A. Ioanes, Administrator of the Foreign Agriculture Service, to try to reach a meeting of minds on a government-wide approach that would serve both our foreign policy and our commercial interests. At such a meeting you might describe the progress being made in Iran toward efficient economic management and stress the importance of promptness and understanding in our dealings with an important transitional country such as Iran. The following points might be made at such a meeting: 1. Iran's Progress and Our New Opportunities. Iran has made such progress in financial management in recent years that we are able gradually to shift our major concern from aid projects to market development. We have made a number of policy changes in the past year to take advantage of growing Iranian financial strength for the benefit of the U.S. balance of payments, including: raising the interest rate on AID development loans and gradually replacing such loans by EXIM lending at commercial rates; shifting our military assistance from an all-grant basis to a combined grant and credit-sales basis; greatly increasing the U.S.-use component of our most recent PL-480 Title I agreement (from 35% to 60%, including Cooley loans); and informing the Iranians that further PL-480 agreements after that of September 29 would be under Title IV (dollar credit sales) rather than Title I. In fact, we may have been overdoing things and making too many changes that impinge on the Iranian balance of payments, which has recently begun to show some unexpected signs of strain. But on balance, we feel that Iran will continue to gain in financial strength over the long term and will offer a growing market for our exports, provided we make the appropriate adjustments in our policies and procedures. As regards agricultural commodities in particular, the rising living standards and the current land reform efforts would seem to portend shortfalls for a number of years in marketable surpluses from domestic production. These opportunities not only offer potential commercial advantages, they also provide what may turn out to be one of our chief means of maintaining U.S. influence in this strategically located country. 2. Obligations of the Emerging Relationship. It thus behooves us to manage our new style of financial-commercial relationship with Iran with care. We expect--and to an increasing degree are receiving--more efficient and business-like response from the GOI in our commercial/financial relationships. The GOI, in turn, expects equally business-like and prompt responses from us. During recent months we have encountered hard bargaining in regard to loan terms, and it has been made clear to us that the GOI is in a position and has the negotiating skill to be quite discriminating, for instance, in the choice of foreign suppliers for capital equipment needed in its sizeable development program. So far our PL-480 terms have remained sufficiently concessionary that we have not had to worry about foreign competition in agricultural commodities, although the Iranians have been frustrated by what appears to them as excessive bureaucratic delay. 3. Current Title I Wheat Program. This is a good case in point. The Iranians officially requested, on June 29, 1964, an amendment to the FY-1964 Title I wheat agreement (for 80,000 tons) raising the amount to 240,000 tons because of an emergency situation created by an unexpected crop failure. The amendment route was preferred in the interests of speed, because the GOI, facing wheat shortages in parts of the country where land had been distributed to former tenants, felt under political pressure to ensure adequate wheat supplies in the countryside as well as in the cities. A new PL-480 agreement (the amendment route was vetoed) was not signed until September 29, the amount was reduced to 140,000 tons (to allow for Title IV private entity transactions and some increase in usual marketings), and the terms were hardened in many respects. As of the present PA's are being issued for 70,000 tons, whereas the Iranians have been pressing continually for issuance of the full amount. As the Iranians see it, their urgent request for wheat, hopefully to be delivered early in the Fall of 1964, has been whittled down and dangerously delayed. None of the explanations we are able to make about the reasons for these actions is very useful in allaying their irritation and feeling that we have let them down. We think the U.S. Government could have acted much more promptly and responsively if all parties concerned had shared the same appreciation of the urgency of the Iranian request and the policy advantages for the U.S. in responding promptly. 4. Current Title IV Feed Grain Request. The GOI on September 8 requested 50,000 tons of feed grains under Title IV to meet unexpected shortages and avoid excessive animal slaughter before cold weather set in. Owing to various delays, we were not able until October 21 to inform the GOI that favorable action was taken on their request, and we still have ahead of us the dispatch of negotiating instructions and the issuance of PA's.
54. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, October 27, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-IRAN. Confidential. Sent also to DOD for Kuss. Repeated to Baghdad, Kuwait, CINCSTRIKE for POLAD, Ankara, Cairo, Karachi, London, and Moscow. 451. Embtel 430./2/ On Oct 25 Majlis approved bill authorizing $200 million USG-guaranteed credit from US banks for purchase military equipment. Majlis approval was unanimous following Prime Minister's briefing in closed session and strong statement in open session. Bill sent to Senate for its "observations" (under Article 46 of constitution Majlis has final word on money bills), after which it returns for second reading. /2/Dated October 20. (Ibid.) Prime Minister's statement advocating passage of credit bill for improving Iranian military posture referred emphatically [to] the "threats against Iran's interests in the Persian Gulf." This was clear reference, as one paper put it, "the claims to Khuzistan Province by Arab radio stations and newspapers linked the regime of Nasser." Mansur made it clear that GOI regards developments in Middle East as currently posing greatest threat. In contrast, in referring to recent changes in Soviet Union he reportedly described U.S.S.R. as "our northern neighbor which has for years adopted a policy of peaceful coexistence" and expressed hope that "political, economic and cultural ties would continue to grow strong." Mansur also expressed appreciation for U.S. aid since World War II and claimed that credit commitments would not detract from development needs and that defense expenditures being kept at lowest possible levels. With reference to CENTO allies he said that "there have not been and will not be any changes in the policies of our CENTO allies." All major press editorials dealt with subject of credit bill and all follow explicit or implicit anti-Nasser line. For example, English-language Tehran journal headlined "Nasser Forces Military Loan" and made passing reference to UAR "Russian-equipped soldiers." We understand that deputies who had talked against govt during recent status bill debate went out of their way this time to compliment govt for its handling of country's defense needs. Word has been passed down last week that Shah wanted credit bill passed by Oct 26, and no nonsense./3/ /3/Airgram A-303 from Tehran, December 15, reported that the "coincidence" of having the parliamentary vote on the status of forces bill followed within 2 weeks by the unanimous vote to accept a $200 million credit from U.S. commercial banks for the purchase of U.S. military equipment had contributed to the widespread belief that in some way the passage of the status bill was the price exacted by the United States for the granting of the credits in question. (Ibid., DEF 15-3 IRAN-U.S.) Rockwell
55. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 3, 1964, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-3 IRAN-US. Confidential. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE for POLAD. 499. Ref Embtels 448, 487 and 495./2/ Vienna Convention--Status Bill. Prime Minister Mansur, in a comprehensive foreign policy speech before the Senate Saturday,/3/ for the first time gave public explanations regarding background and coverage of the Status Bill. Speech was prominently featured by press, rebroadcast over the radio, and has perceptibly improved public climate surrounding the status question. /2/Dated October 27, October 31, and November 2, respectively. (Ibid.) /3/October 31.3 As Kayhan International put it, Mansur's speech "in effect made amends for government's handling of the bill, as far as public was concerned. The administration's hush-hush line had provided fuel for flickering embers of whatever opposition there is in the country. That fire at one moment threatened to spread, with opposition apparently out to exploit what they thought to be government's Achilles heel. And because exact terms of the bill were not known, and it was not possible to determine the extent of immunity granted, the critics, working from their pulpit sanctuaries or fifth column hideouts, spread the lie that very independence and sovereignty of Iran were being bartered." Among Deputies and Senators, there is rejoicing that the air has been cleared by Mansur's statement. Unfortunately, however. PriMin's speech contained not only helpful statements but also number of glaring inaccuracies which look good to the public but apparently involved serious misrepresentation of the bill's coverage. In particular, he was reported to have said three things which are wrong: (1) that, whereas the U.S. had asked dependents to be covered, they are excluded from coverage by the wording of the law; (2) that only on-duty offenses are covered by immunity, apparently without distinction between civil and criminal offenses; and (3) that, although the US had asked all members of advisory missions to be covered, the law actually covers only those who fulfill technical advisory functions. Ziai, Chairman of Majlis Foreign Affairs Committee, acknowledged to us Sunday that these statements correspond neither to the law nor, in particular, to the legislative history. FonMin told us privately on the same day that he was aware Mansur had said things that were not true; but we could not rely on Aram to set things right. Accordingly, I sought urgent interview with Mansur yesterday and, while congratulating him on the popular success he had scored with his speech, asked him how we are to report certain apparent mistakes which might be due to misquotation by the press but which could cause future trouble. He backed down all along the way. Regarding families, he said he might have used the wrong word but had meant to refer to members of household who are not members of family. (I believe he really had believed that members of the family were not covered, but realized his error when I pointed out to him the relevant provision of the convention. It is also possible that others beforehand had alerted him to his mistake. He subsequently phoned to say he was arranging to have official record of his remarks amended to make clear he was referring to non-American members of household.) As for on-duty or off-duty distinction, he had clearly said, he claimed, that this applies only to civil liability. And as for coverage of members of advisory missions, he had only meant to say that Iranian employees of those missions cannot enjoy immunities. I then asked what he intended to do to rectify the erroneous public impression which his remarks had created, adding that I had refused to answer press queries as to whether Embassy agreed with PriMin until I had chance to talk with him. His reply was instantaneous: by no means must there be further public discussion of this matter. Mistakes could be corrected by amending the record. He did not even wish the Foreign Ministry to be brought into the matter for time being. PriMin said he had certain difficulties due to fact that Vienna Convention had inadvertently been submitted to Majlis minus one article. When this and other elements of the record had been tidied up, GOI would formally notify Embassy that law applying provisions of Vienna Convention to members U.S. Military Advisory Mission was in effect. The full provisions of the convention would apply. I said I was glad to hear this, as both U.S. and Iran had suffered from this long drawn-out process, and we must make certain that the goal we have both been seeking is fully achieved. Furthermore, when General Eckhardt had recently discussed matter with Shah, latter had given no indication at all that he had in mind anything but the full application of the provisions of the convention to the US Military Advisory Missions. This incident clearly demonstrates importance that must be attached to early formal clarification of the coverage obtained through the status bill, and notably the continued validity of our original exchange of notes. It also shows timeliness of our recommendation in Embtel 495, which involves some sweetening of pill to obtain the desired result. If the Foreign Ministry balks at providing the necessary languages we must hold the Prime Minister to his word and if necessary go the Shah. We have been fighting too long to achieve this coverage for our military people, and received too much in the way of unfavorable public repercussions, largely as a result of the ineptitude of the GOI in handling this matter. To risk losing our full goal at this stage of the game owing to lack of precision or effort by some Iranian officials to engage in back-tracking maneuvers. Rockwell
56. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 4, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 IRAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Jidda, Karachi, and Kuwait. 508. Embtel 278./2/ Reliably reported that Ayatollah Khomeini, dissident religious leader, was arrested in Qom yesterday, brought to Tehran, and taken across the border to exile in Turkey. As reported NIT-6560, Khomeini clearly over-stepped bounds when, in connection with criticism of the Status Bill according immunities to U.S. military advisors, he not only attacked approval of bill by Majlis as disgraceful, illegal, and "against Islam and the Koran" but also called for overthrow of the govt by the Imperial Iranian Army./3/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Part of Tehran bazaar closed down, but city quiet. Tehran radio announced exile today without specifying where. /2/Dated September 10. (Ibid.) /3/A translation of Khomeini's speech on October 26 is attached to airgram A-233 from Tehran, November 10. (Ibid., POL 30 IRAN) Rockwell
57. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 5, 1964, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Confidential. 515. Deptel 359./2/ ForMinister spoke to me at some length yesterday about Prince Mahmud Reza's difficulties with Gudarzian. He said Shah and Prince are incensed about this matter and cannot understand how things could have developed to point that Prince's account was about to be sequestered, obviously on basis falsified documents since no check given Gudarzian and Prince not in US at time papers allegedly served upon him, and furthermore how this could have been going on without Prince knowing anything about it until very last moment. Aram said did not see how this kind of development could fail have adverse effect on reputation US banks here, since news bound get around. Amb Foroughi had just cabled recommending that Princess Fatimeh withdraw any funds she might have in US banks lest these be put in danger of blocking. (Aram didn't think she had any deposited in U.S.) /2/Telegram 359 to Tehran, October 27, instructed the Embassy to inform the Foreign Ministry that Khaibar Gudarzian had obtained a New York court default judgment against Prince Mahmud Reza for an amount in excess of $1 million, based on Gudarzian's claim that the Prince had given a check for this amount to the World Sport Federation, which was not honored upon presentation. Court records indicated that the Prince had been personally served with papers at Kennedy Airport in New York on August 8, 1963, and had so far presented no defense. Thus, the court was prepared to issue a default judgment against the Prince's Morgan Guaranty Bank account unless he took some effective legal action without delay. (Ibid.) At same time Aram showed me article from New York Daily News of Oct. 29 reporting this whole matter in manner highly unfavorable to Royal Family here, which he said had angered Shah very much. He added both Shah and he convinced that such article would not have appeared, and Gudarzian would not have undertaken this legal action, had USG taken steps to warn Gudarzian of consequences of any further activity against good relations between Iran and US. After it had been so clearly shown that Gudarzian's assertions to McClellan Committee were nothing but falsehoods, why had USG done nothing to prevent Gudarzian from taking further action based on same falsehoods, or at least to make sure that his moves were ineffective? How did it happen that bank had so easily disclosed amount of Prince's account? Shah and Aram were at loss understand how a crook like Gudarzian should be able get away with all this, apparently so easily. He was even reported as having said that some people in State Dept were not displeased that he was embarrassing Iranian Royal Family. All this having very unfortunate effect on Shah, said Aram. I made usual points that a Chief of State should not permit himself be disturbed by attacks of man like this, since such developments are part of penalties of being in public life; US political and legal system unfortunately offers opportunities for abuse; courts must take cognizance of complaints brought before them and cannot evaluate substance until these heard; I understood steps to deport Gudarzian underway and perhaps he seeking delay deportation by undertaking new legal action; as Aram knew, Dept had offered provide Prince's lawyer with info concerning Gudarzian's past record. It was clear from Aram's reception of all this that it did not impress him and that he did not believe it would impress Shah. I do not myself understand how Gudarzian was able to get so far with the New York Court, assuming truth of Prince's statement that he not in US at time papers reportedly served upon him. I would welcome any info Dept can send me which may be helpful in counteracting highly unfavorable impression this matter has created here. Could not Dept take stronger action to warn Iranian troublemakers of this kind against abusing hospitality of US to create trouble for govt with which US maintains friendly relations?/3/ /3/Telegram 399 to Tehran, November 10, informed the Embassy that the court had granted a continuation of the case until November 20 and that the Department was actively pursuing with the Department of Justice and INS all possible means of moving against Gudarzian and his associates. (Ibid.) Rockwell
58. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 5, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Jidda, Karachi, and Kuwait. 521. Embtel 508./2/ Tehran remains quiet following public announcement Khomeini exile. Mass communications media refer fact of exile (but not venue) and also report Khomeini recently "highly critical" Status Bill. Some closure Tehran Bazaar yesterday and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] half Tehran Bazaar closed today at 0900. No incidents reported at Qom Nov. 4 and 5 (to 1100). Special forces group alerted yesterday to full standby status but released from alert 1030 today. One army battalion sent to Qom as precautionary measure. Security authorities do not expect any serious trouble. /2/Document 56. Although GOI had watched Khomeini closely since his release from confinement last spring, it probably would have continued to tolerate his speeches and leaflets as long as his political comments avoided outright subversion. However, his reported call for govt overthrow and related attempt suborn armed forces was straw that broke camel's back. What is unusual is relative moderation of punishment (exile) when considering GOI action against persons committing similar offenses in past. Nevertheless, since govt has not really explained why he was exiled, widespread impression undoubtedly exists that it was only because of his criticism of Status Bill and $200 million US loan. This is unfortunate and further involves US in conflict between govt and opposition, in which privileges for US military personnel have been seized upon as issue on which govt is most vulnerable. Govt is now making concerted effort to link Khomeini with foreign enemies. After PriMin's reference to "fifth columnists" making trouble over the Status Bill (in his Senate speech last Saturday), press is now rather more explicitly linking Khomeini and Nasser. Thus New Iran Party newspaper in connection with Khomeini exile says "enemies of Iran casting covetous eyes on Khuzistan and the Persian Gulf are trying to disturb the peace in Iran through their paid agents and hirelings." Ajang recalls that last year Khomeini's statements were broadcast over Radio Cairo. Paper even accuses Khomeini of having joined in the call to apply the name Arabian Gulf to the Persian Gulf. Poste Tehran says Khomeini was prepared to give Iranian oil to Nasser. Rockwell
59. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, December 9, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-3 IRAN-U.S.. Confidential. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and CINCSTRIKE for POLAD. 643. Deptel 419 and Embtel 630./2/ Vienna Convention. I am pleased to report that we have today consummated satisfactory exchange of notes on immunities and exemptions of our Military Missions in Iran. /2/Dated November 16 and December 5, respectively. (Ibid.) There are altogether three notes, texts of which will be pouched: 1. One Iranian note referring to our note 299 and transmitting text of law passed on October 13 (Emb A-195);/3/ /3/Dated October 27. (Ibid.) 2. Another Iranian note also replying to our note 299, referring to recent ratification of Vienna Convention, and containing satisfactory statement that immunities and exemptions will apply to "American military and non-military personnel who are in Iran under agreements or arrangements between the two govts." 3. Our reply, acknowledging the two replies to our note 299 as also constituting favorable and acceptable response to our note 243, and adding waiver provision as per Deptel 419 with restrictive definition (accepted by FonOff) to make sure it cannot be invoked in case of traffic and other minor offenses./4/ /4/Telegram 413 to Tehran, November 13, had authorized the Embassy to affirm that U.S. authorities would give sympathetic consideration to a request from Iranian authorities for waiver of immunity in cases where those authorities considered such a waiver to be of particular importance. (Ibid.) Telegram 419 to Tehran, November 16, added a restrictive definition to the waiver provision to ensure that it would not be invoked in the case of traffic or other minor offenses. (Ibid.) Dept will note that manner in which notes have been drafted also relieves us of need to argue that units such as Gulf district, signal relay etc. come under heading of "advisory" as note two covers everybody not covered under note one. In difficult and protracted discussions to bring about this result it has been necessary to modify language supplied in Deptel 413, but all our essential requirements are met and in some cases they are exceeded. Status law has not yet been promulgated. Probable date of promulgation is December 17. Holmes [Continue with the next documents] |
