

"I am of course, familiar with long standing boundary dispute. Nevertheless, area concerned has long been claimed by Saudi Arabia. Our present work in area is undertaken with permission and approval of His Majesty's Government."²

"Our current field season is drawing to close and it is anticipated that party working toward coast will be dispersed in course of next week. Such dispersal is however, in course of seasonal programming and without prejudice either to rights and claims of Saudi Arabia or our concession rights in kingdom.

"Yours very truly, R. L. Keyes".

3. Keyes stated he has instructed party continue work to coast and has informed SAG Riyadh of foregoing. He also states he anticipates party will leave disputed area by evening June 8.³

WADSWORTH

² Telegram 347 to Jidda, June 7, not printed, informed the Embassy the Department of State was puzzled by the phrase "with permission and approval" of the Saudi Arabian Government, in light of previous Aramco assertions that the Saudi Arabians had ordered it into the disputed area. The Department wondered if Aramco's role had been more active than it appeared and it requested the Embassy's evaluation. (780.022/6-854)

³ Telegram 5587 from London, June 8, not printed, reported that a fairly sizeable force was moving toward the Aramco party. A Foreign Office official informed the Embassy the matter had been discussed by the Cabinet over the weekend and the situation was causing "great concern" to the British Government. When an Embassy officer reported the Aramco party should be out by that night and said he hoped an incident could be averted, the Foreign Office official replied that the British shared that hope, but he pointed out that Aramco had been warned. (780.022/6-854)

No. 1567

780.022/6-1154: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

JIDDA, June 11, 1954—9 a. m.

506. Re Deptel 347, June 7.²

1. Since question of Aramco resuming exploration in disputed eastern area was first raised by SAG in conversations with Ohliger last March I have sensed Aramco's policy attitudes increasingly determined by following three primary considerations:

a. Desire avoid involvement in boundary dispute between governments. (A policy enunciated in writing to British following 1949 Stobart incident.) This led to Aramco taking basic position which it

¹ Repeated to London and Dhahran.

² Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.