

Reaction Saudi Ambassador during talk with Bruce noncommittal. However, in immediately following talk with Hart, Ambassador expressed concern regarding transmittal United States position to King because of King's strong objections to arbitration Buraimi dispute and because King would interpret United States refusal to participate on plebiscite commission as United States unwillingness to help Saudi Arabia.

For your information, Department concerned to learn just recently that in talk with Faisal in New York in late November Eden spoke rather freely giving strong indication United States had agreed support arbitration. British have not volunteered any information on this meeting.

ACHESON

No. 1502

780.022/1-2053: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1953—6:57 p. m.

444. Embtel 559 rptd London 42 Dhahran 204.² Dept agrees that approach supporting arbitration might better be combined with discussion other pending matters and that representations should be made initially at least to Crown Prince, since Yassin already aware our position. However it would appear likely that opportunity would also arise to support arbitration in subsequent talk with King.

¹ Drafted by Fritalan and cleared by NE and BNA. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

² Telegram 428 to Jidda, Jan. 15, informed the Embassy a British Embassy representative in Washington had suggested that the Department of State request the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia to urge the King to accept British proposals for arbitration of the Buraimi dispute, and asked the Ambassador's view on the best way to gain the King's acceptance. (780.022/1-1553)

Telegram 559 from Jidda, Jan. 20, agreed it was desirable to support arbitration and appreciated the reservations of the Department on the manner and method of U.S. support. Ambassador Hare saw a clear differentiation between the British concept of a "common front" against the Saudis and the U.S. concept of an "honest broker" between two friends. Although the King was well aware of the U.S. position, the Ambassador was willing to add some arguments in support of arbitration even though he did not agree his action would have the effect the British hoped for. He suggested it might be better for him to go to Dhahran, rather than Riyadh, and discuss arbitration with the Crown Prince rather than the King. He also considered it advisable to combine a discussion of arbitration with other subjects pending with the Saudi Arabian Government. (780.022/1-2053)