

No. 1486

*Editorial Note*

On October 13 the Second Secretary of the Saudi Arabian Embassy telephoned twice to give the Department of State the substance of five cables from King Ibn Saud to the Ambassador concerning the Buraimi dispute. One telegram was dated October 11 and four were dated October 13. (Memoranda of telephone conversations, October 13; 641.86A/10-1352) On October 15 the Second Secretary telephoned again to give the Department of State the substance of a cable dated October 14 from the King to the Ambassador, complaining that the British troops in the area were not keeping their promise to cease their operations and activities in the Buraimi area. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, October 15; 786A.022/10-1552)

No. 1487

780.022/10-1852: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 18, 1952—2:10 p. m.

2758. SA Amb Shaikh Asad called on UnSecy Bruce today at latter's request to receive Dept's promised report on results US informal efforts abate critical situation Buraimi. Shaikh Asad however began conversation by citing msg from King stating Brit by acts not indicating genuine acceptance standstill arrangement but delaying resumption talks and continuing their interference with Saudi subjects Buraimi area. (He was not specific re interference.) King had therefore proposed US arrange for a tripartite comm (US, UK and SAG members) to proceed Buraimi area to verify situation including status of allegiances.<sup>2</sup>

Bruce cool to this proposal on grounds: (1) arrangement for and despatch such comm if possible at all wld be very time consuming and (2) US felt by acceptance both UK and SAG of standstill pro-

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Hart and cleared by NEA and BNA. Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 252 from Jidda, Oct. 19, the Ambassador reported a meeting the previous day in which the Crown Prince transmitted a message from the King asking for a tripartite committee. Ambassador Hare said he would transmit the King's message to the Department of State but, since he had personally assumed responsibility for framing the three-point proposal being implemented, he suggested the parties concerned should emphasize making that plan work. (780.022/10-1952) For details of the plan, see telegram 91, Document 1481.