

He informed me that he might go to Geneva for a few days early in May where he would meet many personalities. When I asked if the local political situation would permit him to be away in early May, he replied that only time would tell. He said he desired to let the present government carry on if it did its duty as it had good men in it, mentioning particularly Deputy Prime Minister Baban and Minister Interior Qazzaz, and that they were putting pressure at appropriate times on Dr. Jamali to exert leadership necessary to carry through the government's program. He then added that the army and police had been working so hard to save the city of Baghdad from drowning that they were incapable at the moment of handling serious demonstrations. Therefore, until the flood waters were no longer a threat and the army and police were in a position to handle demonstrations, Baban, Qazzaz and other like-minded cabinet members were not desirous of pressing the government into taking a position publicly on controversial matters. On the other hand, the elements of instability were trying to press the government into taking openly positions on controversial matters while the security forces were off balance. He commented that the next ten days would be interesting.

BERRY

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*Editorial Note*

Telegram 637 from Baghdad, April 23, reported a meeting between Ambassador Berry and Prime Minister Jamali on April 20. At that time, they reached agreement on the final points to be covered in the note on military aid. The Ambassador told Jamali that in view of the special internal legal problem in Iraq, the United States would not insist on using the word "agreement" in the final paragraph of its note, but would use the word "understanding" instead. The United States did, however, consider the exchange of notes to constitute an international agreement and would eventually publish the notes and register them with the United Nations. The Prime Minister agreed.

On the morning of April 21, the Ambassador called at the Foreign Office and formally presented a fresh draft of the United States note on military aid for Iraq. Acting Foreign Minister Jamali read a translation of a draft reply he had already prepared, which the Ambassador considered acceptable. The Council of Ministers and the King approved the Iraqi reply later that same day.