

factory cooperative agreement before we attempt to move further in our military understanding with Iraq.

The Prime Minister said there was nothing he could say in reply except that "we are losing time". It was impossible for him to place himself more than he had at the service of the West. He wished to receive US military aid. He believed in the Turkish-Pakistan pact but Iraqi adherence had to come at the proper time. He made no comment on my suggestion that he seek talks with Turkey and Pakistan.

He said that in becoming Prime Minister he had developed three avenues for combatting Communism in Iraq: (1) development of political organization and stability; (2) development of the country; and (3) development of defense capabilities, with the international alignments necessary to this end. These alignments had to come step by step and with careful advance preparation of public opinion. He had now met reverses on all three approaches but he would continue to work for his objectives in and out of office.

He also commented that he was inclined to believe we were making too much of the Cairo statement. The Iraqi Ambassador there had not been authorized to make it and it had been badly translated. Nevertheless, he felt that the decision to suspend negotiations arose not from the statement or from Arab League action or local events but rather from "unfortunate trends" in Washington under Israeli pressures.<sup>4</sup>

BERRY

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 584 to Baghdad, Apr. 17, authorized the Ambassador to suspend the action ordered in telegram 577, pending further word from the Department of State concerning telegram 621, Apr. 16, *supra*. Telegram 625 from Baghdad, Apr. 18, informed the Department that upon receipt of telegram 584, the Ambassador telephoned the Prime Minister and asked him to consider the conversation described here as personal and confidential until the Ambassador could talk with him again. Documentation is in Department of State file 787.5 MSP.

### No. 1413

787.5 MSP/4-1954; Telegram

#### *The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1954—6:06 p. m.

588. After further study, Department has decided authorize signature of MDAP agreement with Iraq on condition proviso can be attached indicating that US will take into account international

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Jernegan and cleared by NE and U.