

In course of discussion all seemed relieved that our plan will be worked out in cooperation with British. Prime Minister asked why in view of contents of paragraph number one his was necessary to include reference to tripartite declaration which will become subject local attack.³ I said inclusion might make acceptance of agreement somewhat difficult for Iraqis but would make acceptance easier in other quarters. Crown Prince said he did not see any amount of aid mentioned or list of items we will contribute. I said neither could be talked about until survey team had completed its work. He pressed the point but I stood my ground on this, reassuring him to the extent that I anticipated that amount of aid would be substantial in relation to their own military budget.

King reading paragraph 3-A said that we might ask for some service that the Iraqis would be reluctant to give. He asked: "then what?" I replied if we regarded the service as essential we would present request to Iraqis in sufficiently convincing manner that they too would see that it was essential. However if the unlikely should occur, the key words in the paragraph were "as may be agreed upon". Prime Minister in reference to 5-D asked about size of team to come to Iraq. I said it would be small, initially probably not more than ten persons. He said to get public approval of agreement he might need to say that no American troops would be stationed in Iraq, that we asked no special privileges or base rights. I replied that if, after agreement was concluded, it was necessary for him to say such things, we would take an understanding attitude.

BERRY

³ This reference is to the text of the agreement transmitted in telegram 438; see the editorial note, *supra*.

No. 1406

Editorial Note

As an attachment to a letter signed on September 30, 1953, and mailed on October 1, the Under Secretary of State transmitted to the Secretary of Defense a memorandum, dated September 24, entitled "Political Considerations Bearing on U.S. Military Assistance Programs to the Middle East in Fiscal 1954." The fifth section of the memorandum proposed principles for the United States to follow in coordinating possible military assistance to Iraq and Jordan with the British supply programs under way in those countries. In the letter, Smith informed Wilson that if the Department of Defense and the Foreign Operations Administration approved