

Pakistan. Success this effort depends in considerable measure on its being kept secret.

Taking account these considerations, Department of opinion problem you describe might best be approached via question military aid Iraq, which now formally approved by Defense. Although certain additional steps necessary finalize USG position, and undesirable that official information subject be released at this time, Department considers would be appropriate for you inform Jamali orally and in confidence that favorable reply Iraq request military assistance forthcoming near future. This would provide opportunity refer Section 202(b) of MSA which provides authority this offer, and which clearly indicates US interest in ME regional security arrangement. You could point out that although we no longer consider MEDO viable concept, we hope Middle East states themselves will come to appreciate fact that some regional security arrangement essential their interests.

If Jamali should then raise question possible four-power arrangement, you might tell him we informed that Pakistanis had held exploratory discussions subject with Turks and Iraqis and we had expressed our interest such development. You might then follow line para 2 ref tel.

DULLES

No. 1401

7041-854: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State*¹

TOP SECRET

BAGHDAD, January 8, 1954—noon.

398. Prior departure for Beirut and Cairo today (January 7) Prime Minister Jamali requested urgent meeting with me. Subjects foremost in his mind were status Iraq's request for military aid and stories United States military aid program to Pakistan.² Jamali said that Indian Minister in Baghdad called recently and discussed at length reasons why United States arms aid to Pakistan should be opposed by Asian nations. Prime Minister replied Iraq could not ignore the question of its defense as Iraq has oil and occupies a key strategic position and is therefore liable to attack. Having refused advice offered by Indian Minister he proceeded to give him advice saying that India should pursue three courses: (1) settle its difference with Pakistan; (2) arm itself; and (3) cooperate with other

¹ Repeated to Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi.

² For documentation on this topic, see vol. xi, Part 2, pp. 1818 ff.