pects for remaining in force until 1957. Similarly, the informal and confidential views of the representatives of the British Government would be welcomed on such subjects as the present and probable future political stability of the Iraq Government, incidence of Communism and extreme nationalism in Iraq, and any other basic problems in Iraq-Western relations which would have a direct bearing on the Western defensive position in Iraq in the event of emergency.

## No. 1394

787.00/8-2453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Iraq (Ireland) 1

CONFIDENTIAL

BACHDAD, August 20, 1953.

Participants: Dr. Fadhil Jamali, President of Chamber of Deputies

The Ambassador Philip W. Ireland

Dr. Jamali, when he came to call on me at the Embassy last night, was full of the news of the Royalist coup d'état in Iran. <sup>2</sup> He was greatly pleased at the train of events and optimistic as to the future.

He then said he had long wanted to have a serious talk with me concerning the situation in Iraq, which he believed was becoming increasingly critical. He had had long talks with HM the King and HRH the Crown Prince and he hoped they were aware of the situation.

He said internally Iraq had become stagnant. It had immense potentialities: land, resources, wealth, and people. None were being used as they should be. Iraq was a young country but its government was anything but youthful and vigorous. It was a government of old men, bound by the past, incapable of action and of leading Iraq into the future which its resources entitled it. Iraq could make no progress until such government was replaced by young; active and vigorous men whose objectives were progress and reform.

The second necessity facing Iraq was its relations with the West. Iraq should abandon the profitless concept of Arab collective secu-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to a letter from Berry to Parker T. Hart. Stating that Jamali's analysis of Iraq's current problems was accurate, Berry wrote that he was one of the few Iraqis willing to speak out publicly in favor of a closer defense relationship between the Arabs and the Western world. (787.00/8-2453)

<sup>\*</sup> For documentation on Iran, see volume x.