

tion 408(e) and will consult with the Office of the Director for Mutual Security in the process of formulating any documents which will be used for this purpose. I further request that this Office be advised sufficiently in advance of the actual shipment of any equipment to Iraq so that appropriate letters can go forward to interested Congressional Committees.

I am sending an identical letter to the Secretary of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN

No. 1385

787.5 MSP/10-2252 Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq*¹

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 24, 1952—5:55 p. m.

462. Embtel 521 Oct 22.²

1. Re para one reftel Dept notified Brit Emb rep Oct 21 and Secy told Jamali Oct 21 in long amiable conversation at UNGA.³ Jamali of course professed ignorance declaration but was pleased with news.

2. Re para 2(b) Deptel 436⁴ Dept wishes avoid giving Iraqis any impression (a) that US is attempting supersede UK or (b) that competitive US-UK bidding will be order of day, therefore suggests some palatable presentation para 2(b) be made Iraqis, possibly along fol lines "US recognizes IG difficulties purchasing certain categories arms from UK within reasonable time to satisfy IG plans for phase reorganization Iraqi forces. Therefore as tangible evidence concerted Western intent strengthen indigenous NE de-

¹ Drafted by Worcester and cleared by S/MSA, BNA, NE, and Defense. Repeated to London. Instruction No. 11 to the Embassy in Baghdad, also dated Oct. 24, transmitted the draft texts of notes which might be exchanged between the Embassy and the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs. Also enclosed was an illustrative list of military equipment which might be made available for purchase following the signing of the agreement. (787.5 MSP/10-2452) Telegram 617 from Baghdad, Nov. 14, informed the Department of State that Ambassador Berry had told the Acting Foreign Minister of Iraq's eligibility for aid and left him copies of the notes transmitted in Instruction No. 11. (787.5 MSP/11-1452)

² Not printed. The first paragraph informed the Department of State the Embassy believed that to obtain the maximum political advantage from reimbursable military aid to Iraq, notification should take place in Baghdad at a time to be agreed on between the Embassy and the Department. (787.5 MSP/10-2252)

³ The conversation under reference here occurred in New York at the Seventh Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

⁴ See footnote 3, *supra*. Paragraph 2 informed the Embassy that U.S. aid to Iraq should be a substitute only for material that could not be furnished by the United Kingdom within a reasonable period of time.