

agreement already reached and to provoke serious objections and renewed suspicions on part of Egyptians. (My telegram 1137)

In light of foregoing I would strongly urge that every effort be made to avoid presenting Egyptians with elaborate, detailed proposal for foreign civilian contract maintenance on terms which GOE would be likely to reject. Particularly objectionable from Egyptian viewpoint would be British military inspectorate (mixed inspectorate might be less so). Also suggested numbers of foreign technicians appear exorbitant in view of proposed installation reductions although this might be offset somewhat by proposal to train Egyptian replacements.

Presentation of basic idea in somewhat general form is much more likely to evoke favourable Egyptian response. Details of operation, nature of firm to be employed, question of US participation, etc could be worked out quietly over negotiating table with US helping "behind the scenes" as usual.

CAFFERY

No. 1323

Editorial Note

On April 17, 1954, General Muhammad Naguib resigned as Prime Minister of Egypt and was replaced by Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasir, who retained his chairmanship of the Revolutionary Command Council. General Naguib remained President of Egypt until November 15, 1954.

No. 1324

874.00/4-2254: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

PARIS, April 22, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 4. After lunch April 22, I mentioned to Eden our desire to move on economic aid to Egypt which I recalled we had deferred for months at his request. Apart from technical consideration of approaching end of our fiscal year and hence availability funds, I said I believed such action by US, if publicly supported by UK and

¹ Repeated to London as telegram 957 and to Cairo as telegram 39. For an explanation of Secretary Dulles' presence in Paris, see footnote 1, Document 1321.