

exaggerating political difficulties he faces with Churchill and backbenchers.

I assume that if you and President should be favorably inclined towards Eden's proposal you might consider action by NSC necessary and that this would involve delay. If you could give me your preliminary reaction in meantime I am sure it would be greatly appreciated by both Eden and Churchill.

ALDRICH

No. 1300

741.56374/3-1954

*Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1954.

Subject: British Proposal on Suez.

Attached is a summary of today's State-JCS meeting regarding the recent British proposal on Suez which I believe you may find useful preparatory to your meeting with Admiral Radford on this subject tomorrow morning.²

[Attachment]

SUMMARY OF STATE-JCS MEETING—MARCH 19, 1954

Subject: British Proposal on Suez (London's 3991)

After introductory remarks by Mr. Murphy, Mr. Jernegan outlined the British proposal, emphasizing that any feasible arrangement with respect to Suez on a purely Anglo-Egyptian basis would probably be unacceptable to the British; but that if the U.S. agreed to the British proposition, it would certainly be acceptable to the British, and probably to the Egyptians. It was pointed out that more intransigence on the part of the British and a series of incidents might be expected if some new step of this kind were not taken. Special reference was made to the importance the British attach to the Egyptians creating an atmosphere of "mutual confidence". The basic questions are:

1. How long can Eden hold the Conservatives in line?

¹ Drafted by John Goodyear, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State.

² No record of this meeting has been found in the Department of State files.