

ish should be told in effect that we have taken our decision and intend to proceed immediately without regard to their views. It has not seemed to us that the situation in Egypt has reached the point which would justify us in risking what the Embassy describes as a "gross breach of faith" in failing to consult, in the true sense of that word, with the United Kingdom. We have in mind among other things our present efforts to persuade the British to modify their position with regard to availability and uniforms, as well as their considerable sensitivity on the Egyptian problem by reason of the domestic political situation in the U.K.

*Recommendation:*

The U.K. should be consulted, rather than merely informed, about our plans to grant economic assistance to Egypt.

No. 1245

641.74/11-1253: Telegrams

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1953--4:56 p. m.

2570. Following is possible language re Suez Base on "availability" and "uniforms" which conforms to Secretary's suggestions to UK Ambassador (Deptel 2521).<sup>2</sup>

Availability--UN clause to read "In the event of a recommendation by the UN that the base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace or breach of the peace or an act of aggression by an outside power, and recognizing her responsibilities under the UN Charter and the Uniting-for-Peace resolution; Egypt will afford etc." (Cairo's 488). This retains UN action as criterion for availability and should dissipate possible Egyptian fear clause would be invoked in dispute between Arab States and Israel. Citing responsibilities under UN Charter and Uniting-for-Peace resolution as basis for clause might make it more palatable to Egyptians.

Uniforms--"Outside base area and when off duty within it British personnel will wear civilian clothes. When on duty in base in-

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Cairo as telegram 588.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2521 to London, Nov. 9, not printed, the Embassy was informed that on Nov. 3, the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador discussed the Suez Base negotiations. The Ambassador stated that availability was still the great obstacle, saying that the Egyptians had rejected language from the Uniting for Peace Resolution because they suspected it might be invoked in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Secretary of State suggested that some formula under which United Nations action could still be used should be found with the qualification that the Arab-Israel conflict should be excluded. (641.74/11-953)