

Our coin with Egyptians is pretty well exhausted, however, as a result of our repeatedly pushing them into concessions.

CAFFERY

No. 1235

641.74/10-2253: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*¹

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 23, 1953—7:15 p. m.

2202. After consideration all factors bearing on Anglo-Egyptian meeting October 21 we concur with Cairo's 489 that Egypt unlikely yield on substance two issues "availability" and "uniforms".

Re Availability. We believe little practical difference exists in effect of British wording on UN clause (Paragraph g Cairo's 488) and Egyptian offer to include specific reference to Egypt's responsibilities under UN Charter and Uniting for Peace Resolution (Cairo's 486).² In fact, Egyptian suggestion offers certain advantages to Western Powers over British wording: (1) Proposed re-affirmation of Egyptian responsibilities would have practical results comparable to those achieved by including in treaty clause suggested by British. (2) Under Egyptian proposal, Egypt would be under pressure make base available in event of UN recommendation either under Chapter VI or under Uniting for Peace Resolution while under British formula similar pressure would exist only in unlikely event UN specifically requested base.

Re Uniforms. Last meeting serves reinforce US view on uniforms as expressed to Eden by Secretary (London's Secto 20 and Dulte 2).³ Our attitude remains as stated Tedul 5.

Embassy London requested bring foregoing to attention Foreign Office.

Egyptian UN Delegation today raised question implication consultation clause (paragraph f, Cairo's 488) and expressed fear this implied agreement would continue in perpetuity. Request clarification from UK and report from Cairo on whether matter raised there.

DULLES

¹ Also sent to Cairo as telegram 472.

² See footnote 2, Document 1233.

³ See footnote 3, Document 1230.