

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204. "Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill"

*President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill*

SECRET AND PERSONAL

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1953.

DEAR WINSTON: While I have met Lord Salisbury only once or twice—and then very briefly—I am quite sure that I shall come to share your high opinion of him. Everything I have ever heard about him leads me to such a conclusion. Foster knows him and has the highest regard for him.

In the Egyptian affair we, of course, always have wanted to obtain a solution that would conform as nearly as possible to Case A.<sup>1</sup> However, we have recognized the probability that some concessions would have to be made to Egyptian pride and spirit of nationalism. And so, in our thinking we established Case B<sup>1</sup> as representative of a minimum position, and have hoped for an agreement that would be somewhere in between these two cases—as near, of course, to Case A as possible.

We shall certainly be ready to talk to Lord Salisbury about the matter. In laying out a program looking toward a settlement, we earnestly believe it would be a grave error to ignore the intensity of Egyptian popular feeling. Dictators can never afford to cease striving for popularity; I think that the methods by which they normally come to power inspire them with a feeling of great personal insecurity. In Egypt, if Naguib thought that the population wanted him to be conservative and reasonable, we would have no trouble whatsoever. As it is, I think he feels he is sitting on a lid that covers a seething desire to throw out every foreigner in the country. In other words, he believes that any formula found for the solution of this problem must have appealing features for the Egyptian population—otherwise he will find himself happy indeed to join another Egyptian exile, now in Italy.

It is possible that whatever difference there may be in our respective approaches to this whole Egyptian affair springs out of our differing estimates of the flexibility that Naguib feels is available to him in negotiation. We believe that he is very definitely a prisoner of local circumstances of which the most important is Egyptian nationalism, and consequently he will act and react in accordance with them.

[Here follows discussion of the possibility of holding a Four-Power meeting later in the year; the prospects of the French Par-

<sup>1</sup> See Document 1061.