

Re Item (3): During March talks Eden received a very strong telegram from Churchill objecting to any compromise with Case A. This discussed at length between Under Secretary and Eden and Churchill finally assented. Following is substantive portion of Item (3):

"We had rather long talk during which I pointed out that British apprehension with regard to second alternative (B) was largely matter of interpretation of most desirable result; i.e. base in continuous operation immediately available on D-Day, and less desirable but acceptable alternative of base which could be put in effective operation within 60 days. I left quite certain British would agree to this since I was sure views expressed in Prime Minister's cable were his alone and not as he indicated those of Slim and Alexander. Monday morning, a few minutes before our meeting with the President, the Prime Minister agreed to this arrangement which was accepted by the President as a negotiable basis. The President indicated that our military representatives should arrange to ensure 'proper technical supervision and inspection' of communications and other heavy installations at the base."

DULLES

No. 1187

641.74/6-1152: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*¹

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 17, 1953—6:31 p. m.

8011. Message from President to Churchill mentioned immediately preceding telegram follows:

Verbatim text.

"Dear Winston: Thank you very much for your prompt response to my recent message on Egypt. There are certain passages in your reply which I fail to understand, but I believe it more profitable to leave these for the personal talks we anticipate in Bermuda.

"I was interested to note that Robertson feels that agreement might be reached which would retain the essentials of Case A,² providing there is reasonably prompt resumption of discussions and that some adjustments are made to meet Egyptian sensibilities.

"As you know, I personally believe that the best interests of all of us will be served if friendly discussions are promptly resumed in Cairo. Obviously, however, it would be worse than futile to resume those talks unless you and I are absolutely clear as to the mini-

¹ Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2371. Drafted by Burdett and approved by the Secretary of State.

² See Document 1061.