3. From parliamentary and public opinion points of view, even this program would require some modification, perhaps along lines

paragraph 3, Embassy telegram 6245.

4. From point of view of prudence, British would heartily concur with statement reiterated penultimate paragraph Department telegram 7639 3 re assuring that as we proceed, "precision and details take place of vagueness and generality".

I realize that in situation such as that which at present confronts us in Egypt and Near East generally, certan risks are necessary. In this case, however, it seems to me that Western security stakes in canal base are so high that we must exert every possible effort to minimize such risks. Cairo's 2512 makes point that "Egyptians do not feel moral or ideological compulsion to insure Western security requirements, nor can they be bought by promises of financial assistance". Is it likely this situation will change in flushed and emotional atmosphere of ostensibly unconditional British evacuation? Will uncommitted RCC then be willing set about forcefully to lead public opinion to realization of Egypt's wider security responsibilities in sufficient time to permit conclusion effective Western arrangements for defense of area involving use of base?

I agree we should make every effort facilitate to extent possible RCC's public opinion problem, and secret assurances seem to me safest device which has thus far been developed for accomplishing this end.

ALDRICH

No. 1179

541.74/5-1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 10, 1953—1:50 p. m. 7841. Please deliver following message from President to Churchill:

"From my discussions with Foster about the findings of his recent trip, I am particularly concerned about Egypt. While I will wish to talk to you personally about this matter in Bermuda, ²

^{*} Printed as telegram 2278 to Cairo, Document 1174.

¹ Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2338 eyes only for Ambassador Caffery. (641.74/6-1058) Drafted by Byroade and approved by Secretary of State Dulles.

² Prime Minister Churchill and President Eisenhower planned to meet in late June at Bermuda. The conference, however, was postponed due to illness of both the Continued