

salutary effect on Egyptian attitudes, we are still gravely concerned.

As stated Deptel 678, September 30, 1952, "We must make certain as we proceed that precision and detail take place of vagueness and generality" Essential thing is to obtain undertaking of such definite nature that we could act upon its authority in time of war and that this undertaking be obtained before British withdrawal has passed point of no return.

Department would appreciate Embassy's further views on how this might be accomplished.

SMITH

No. 1175

Editorial Note

At the 147th meeting of the National Security Council on June 1, Secretary Dulles discussed the situation in the Near East and South Asia, including Egypt. For text of the memorandum of discussion at the meeting, see Document 137.

No. 1176

641346-133: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State*¹

TOP SECRET NIACT

CAIRO, June 1, 1953—6 p. m.

2512. Following refers to questions raised Deptel 2278.

1. (a) While it is possible that formal Egyptian commitment on defense arrangements may be obtainable in course of negotiations it will depend on whether US-UK tactics are successful in instilling confidence in Egyptians and creating atmosphere which will enable RCC to cooperate publicly with West powers. We must, however, face the fact that any "package deal"² is out of the question. Evacuation must not be made to appear conditional on area defense commitments from Egypt.

(b) I have every confidence that if problem is approached in this way the RCC will prove reasonable particularly as they will be anxious to qualify for military and economic assistance. The other contingency could in any case be provided for, e.g., British could

¹ Repeated to London as telegram 809.

² See footnote 3, Document 1082.