

tween Washington and London. This illusion was dispelled by Embassy Officer.

Although net effect of Creswell-Selwyn Lloyd *démarche* on Suez has been further to convince Egyptians that British will never peacefully quit their territory on terms acceptable to Egypt I am hopeful that Colonel Nasir will carry the day with his colleagues to the extent that they will make an acceptable counterproposal.

Egyptians made it clear however that they consider British "enemies" as long as they remain in Egypt by force and that they cannot agree to cooperate militarily with British as a condition for evacuation of Egyptian territory. ("This is blackmail".) Under these circumstances Egyptians say Naguib regime is not prepared to stop "mobilizing" Egyptian people while undertaking lengthy and perhaps fruitless negotiations with British.

CAFFERY

No. 1137

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, International file

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to President Eisenhower

SECRET

LONDON, 1st April, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you for your personal letter to me about Egypt dated the 16th March, which Winthrop delivered to me on the 23rd March. ¹ Let me say at once how much encouraged I am by the assumption, which it seems to me underlies everything you say, that you and we must maintain co-operation in these as in all other matters.

As of course you know, our representatives in Cairo have now made further separate approaches to try to get the Egyptian Government to open discussions with us, and we have given the Egyptians a note of the five points in the package proposal, and told them that we are ready to start talks on the basis of these five points, and that we do not seek to fix beforehand the order in which the points are discussed. At the same time we have made it clear that no final or binding agreement would be signed upon any single point until satisfactory understandings had been reached on all the points, which in our view are inseparably bound together. It does seem to me that it would be unreasonable of the Egyptians to refuse to start talks with us on this basis, and we would hope that, once talks had begun, we should be able to convince them of the

¹ Document 1122.