

them. Malenkov and Beria, he says, are united but Molotov is not so closely tied. Anthony and I are doing all we can to urge him to improve his relations with the Italians and also with the Romans.<sup>2</sup> He is very anxious about what would happen if he were attacked all alone. We have said we do not think a local war in Europe is likely or even possible. He was not therefore in particular danger. I pointed out to him the risks we had shown ourselves ready to run by having an American bomber base in this island. The point did not seem to have occurred to him.<sup>3</sup>

Kindest regards,

WINSTON

<sup>2</sup> The Embassy in London in telegram 5153, Mar. 19, not printed, reported that the word "Vatican" should be substituted for "Romans". (774.5/3-1953)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 5154 from London, Mar. 18, not printed, Ambassador Aldrich said that Churchill had sent for him that afternoon to show him the "telegram which he is sending to President re Egypt and also re Tito's visit. He said he felt compelled send cable in order emphasize to President his strong feelings re Egypt, even though Eden is asking through regular channels for reconsideration US position on approach to Egypt." (774.5/3-1853)

### No. 1127

Presidential Correspondence, lot 65 D 204. "Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill February 1953 thru November 1958"

#### *President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1953.

DEAR WINSTON: I am a bit puzzled as to the real meaning of your recent note to me.<sup>1</sup> By no means have I, or my associates, indicated or implied that we are not in agreement with your Government in what you are trying to do in the Canal Zone. On the contrary, Anthony and I reached a clear understanding of what we should strive to get under the various alternatives laid down by the staff, and both of us were very clear that the offer we would be making would be so fair to the Egyptians that we *hoped* it could not possibly be rejected.

While he was here, I raised one question involving procedure. The question was: "How does the United States get into this consultation?"

It was obvious that no one had thought very much on this point and it was recognized a very awkward situation could result for our representative, and, indeed, for the negotiations themselves, if an American should show up without some prior invitation and

<sup>1</sup> Reference is to Churchill's message of Mar. 18, *supra*.