

Secy raised with Eden problem of need for developing peace between Israel and Arab states. Genl agreement reached that shld Egyptian negots go well stage wld be reached where this issue cld be raised actively as Naguib wld then feel strong enough begin deal with it. Also agreed solution refugee problem on resettlement basis important aspect this problem.

Secy pointed out new administration requires additional time study MEDO plan before it can be committed to it. Raised question as to wisdom giving Arabs virtual veto on possible admission Israel. Question adherence Pakistan also discussed and general sentiment both sides appeared to be unwise have Pakistan initial member particularly in view probable complications with India.

DULLES

No. 1113

7745/2-753: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1953—3:58 p. m.

5957. Part 2 of 2 (continuation Deptel 5956).

Dept's Comments: White House formula cited Part 1 reached only after lengthy discussion between Secretary and Eden which made clear that original alternative cases B and C² had never received Cabinet approval London and C now politically impossible in UK. Eden particularly emphasized UK unwilling consider case C since this meant base would be abandoned and he disagreed with earlier UK working level position London talks that case C better than no base agreement. He now believed very questionable whether Cabinet could even accept case B although modifications case A possible for example by reduction number of men listed.

Secretary emphasized this constituted fundamental shift UK position since original UK papers for London talks themselves outlined all three alternative cases. Dept pointed out US Chiefs of Staff also disliked case C but US felt case A almost certainly impossible achieve and believed C should be taken as last resort. Secretary stated believed negotiators should be given authority make best arrangement possible since six months from now we probably unable get what could today. He felt it unrealistic divide matter into set formulae as would inject undue amount rigidity.

¹ Also sent priority to Cairo as telegram 1776. Drafted by Parker T. Hart, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, and approved by Byroade.

² See Document 1061.