

alluded to in any way in any conversations with British since various points involve personal confidences by officials who are not supposed to be aware of differences within the Cabinet.

HOLMES

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No. 1109

7745/2-2852 Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, February 28, 1953—11 a. m.

4848. Eyes only Secretary. I do not regard following encrypted telegram from Aldrich from RMS *Queen Elizabeth* regarding US-UK *ad referendum* agreement on Egypt to be inconsistent with paragraph 1 Embassy's telegram 4840, February 27:

"Eden stated that while Blue Agreement has never been formally approved by Cabinet action HMG in fact desires have it put into effect and desires our full support as indicated to accomplish this."

I believe position to be as follows: (1) There is no Cabinet opposition to agreement *per se*; but (2) Churchill strongly desires military association with negotiations and, in this situation, Cabinet has not given formal approval to agreement pending resolution this question.

I feel confident that regardless our decision re military participation, Eden would want proceed with negotiations on basis [*bases?*] agreement. However, I am sure that you will bear in mind that factors outlined second paragraph Embassy's telegram 4840 together with Churchill's unpredictability, might create complications, and delay. In long run, however, I think Eden would have his way.

HOLMES