

ties. Their views would be helpful to us in devising final list which, as British will see, may contain items which would not be available for two years. While we shall of course bear in mind general question of which items might be better supplied by U.K., we cannot agree this should be limiting factor in connection with such 11 million dollar list as we may finally decide upon.

Once we have British views we shall then screen our list, both from point of view of cost and guerrilla weapons. We shall of course make available final list to U.K. at time we inform Egyptians of our approval this interim aid. We should appreciate receiving British views before end this week.

ACHESON

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No. 1084

744471-2153: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the  
Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, January 21, 1953—4 p. m.

4001. While I appreciate factors in Egyptian situation which led Department to conclusion that we should proceed with interim arms program in Egypt (Deptel 4805, January 19) I feel that I must nevertheless express my strong doubts re wisdom of our making this move over British objections.

I have understood that it is our policy that United Kingdom has primary military responsibility in area. I entirely recognize that United Kingdom capabilities for discharging this responsibility are severely handicapped by existence of Anglo-Egyptian dispute and I approve our desire to do everything possible to promote a settlement. I feel it highly important, however, that our efforts in this direction should be within the framework of our overall obligations to British as an ally. It seems to me that when we decide on course of action over British objections which will have profound effect on security of their armed forces, we are imposing strain on alliance which exposes us to justifiable criticism. British public opinion would react as strongly as would American opinion were the situations reversed. I do not mean to say that concept of interim arms assistance is wrong, I merely mean to say that it is wrong to proceed with it over objections of our ally.

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Cairo as telegram 212.