

Foregoing comment in pursuance of reftel is directed solely to Brit def paper. We do however wish strongly to emphasize that manner in which this negotiation is posed to Egyptians is almost as important as substance of the negot if there is to be any chance of success. We recommend accordingly that question of tactics be given important place on agenda of forthcoming London discussions.

McCLINTOCK

No. 1057

774.5/12-2962: Telegram

*The Chargé in Egypt (McClintock) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

CAIRO, December 29, 1952—4 p. m.

1528. Last night I told three members of the Military High Committee of my contemplated departure for London. They were Colonel Gama abd Al Nasir, number two man to Naguib, Colonel Amin, and Major Hakim Amier. I said that Byroade's visit to London and desire of British Government to discuss overall defense problem was additional proof of serious intent on part of United States and United Kingdom to achieve positive results which would be mutually beneficial to Egypt as well as to the western powers.

On Sudan, Egyptian officers were most skeptical as to British motives. They have pathological distrust of British administration in Sudan and said quite frankly that reason they attached such importance to question of south was their fear that, even in brief three-year period of liquidation of present Sudan Government, British would so excite southerners that they would opt for secession from Sudan and possible annexation to adjoining British colonies.

We explained that British were not as Machiavellian as Egyptians supposed and that British Government had made concession after concession in sincere endeavor to reach meeting of the minds on Sudan. We urged that Egyptians were within striking distance of achieving their strategical objective, which was ultimate British withdrawal from Sudan and that it would be folly for them to break off negotiations on the three "sticking points" on which British Cabinet had taken its decision. On discussing these points we found that the colonels regarded question of Governor General's emergency powers as one of [on?] which agreement could be reached, and that they felt issue of "Sudanization" could be met by

¹ Repeated to London as telegram 518 and to Khartoum as telegram 36.