

advisable because of nature of population there while direct system of voting wld be feasible for Northern Sudan.

We are inclined to take with very large grain of salt Naguib's asserted statement that he wld not discuss Brit proposals of Sept 24 with Sudanese polit leaders. He is seeing members of all Sudanese parties except Umma today.

CAFFERY

No. 1015

715W 00/10-1252: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

CAIRO, October 12, 1952—1 p. m.

921. Last night Emb officers with Burdett had dinner mtg with Col Nasir, Major Hakim Amir, Chief of Cab of Naguib, and Major Salah Salem, member of mil high comite who is charged with co-ordinating activities leading to formulation of new Sudan policy.

It quickly became apparent that these officers had impression that Gen Naguib in his two most recent interviews with Brit Amb on Sudan had made it clear that Egypt had serious reservations to draft statute for Sudan and did not approve statute as now written. Offs also had impression that new constitution for Sudan wld not be promulgated until Egypt Govt had made its reservations known to Brit Govt. They said that purpose of consultation with reps of all Sudanese parties, including Mahdi who arrives Cairo on 19th, was expressly to ascertain Sudanese views on draft statute as well as on broader issues of (a) self-govt and (b) self-determination. Until these consultations were complete they were not yet ready to say specifically what objections they had to draft statute but it was already evident to them that Egypt wld have strong reservations as to wide powers granted Gov Gen under the new constitution.

In presence Emb officers Major Salem telephoned Gen Naguib and confirmed his understanding in terms set forth above.

Stevenson has of course given an accurate account (cf. mytel 910, Oct 10 rptd London 298² and previous) of what Naguib told him.

¹ Repeated to London as telegram 299.

² Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 910, Oct. 10, not printed, that Ambassador Stevenson had seen General Naguib regarding the Sudan the previous evening. Stevenson told Caffery that Naguib had said he believed it possible to achieve a "practical solution" to the Sudan problem. However, he also stated that he had not finished his consultations with the representatives of the Sudanese political parties; therefore, he was not yet able to provide a final answer to the British *démarche* of Sept. 24. Meanwhile, if the British Government felt it essential to

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