

tion attitude of reserve preferred by Brit would have helped no one includ Brit but would have merely dashed cold water on close current US-Egypt relations to disadvantage both US and UK. US felt Naguib regime not extremist although impatiently reformist, and deserved our general encouragement.

Steel did not pursue matter very intently and appeared not excessively disturbed. Byroade pointed out US-UK basic objectives Egypt really the same.

ACHESON

No. 1010

774.00/9-1852 Telegram

*The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

CAIRO, September 18, 1952—7 p. m.

730. Lt. Col. Amin came to me today with msg from Gen Naguib and mil group running Egypt. Msg was as fols:

1. After eight weeks concentration on domestic issues mil now believe time has come to move into next stage of revolution and consider Egypt's internatl position.

2. They are completely on side of US and unalterably opposed to Communism.

3. Their first problem is "selling US to Egypt public" and educating average Egypt on dangers of Communism.

4. To sell US to Egypt public they need "mil supplies and fin assistance from US".

5. In exchange they are prepared give in secret certain commitments concerning long-term objectives of movement including MEDO and/or partnership with US.

6. They believe giving commitments openly at this time wld destroy chance of achieving objectives, but want to work as rapidly as poss toward open commitments.

Col. Amin said mil's questions were:

(1) Wld US be interested in such coop?

(2) What sort of secret commitments wld US want and wld Naguib be acceptable as their author?

Group had obviously not worked out definitions of "fin and mil assistance" as this was a "feeler" conversation on principles involved. Amin had in mind "Cld you perhaps buy our cotton?" on financial side and "tank parts, armoured cars, gun tubes, small ammunition and radio sets" on mil side. He reiterated again and

¹ Repeated to London as telegram 251 and unnumbered to Paris and Rome.