

77400/9-852: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

CAIRO, September 8, 1952—4 p.m.

605. It is unfortunate but fact that Ali Maher simply failed to understand fundamentals of what happened in Egypt as result of the coup. Concentration on why various steps could not be taken instead of on realization some steps had to be taken cost him the PriMin. Notwithstanding our warnings he had no real understanding of danger he was in until last minute. He then rushed thru the Cab agreement on prin of restricting max agric landholdings but it was too little and too late. This calling of a meeting of landowners after 6 weeks of delays and giving them another 48 hours to submit their views was last straw with mil who were also incensed when they heard Maher at Stevenson's suggestion was contemplating assisting Prince Mohamed Ali in getting funds out of Egypt.

With Maher fall Brit are at present literally out in cold here in Egypt. Mil will not only have nothing whatever to do with them but are convinced Brit are attempting sabotage their movement. Altho this is of course fantastic Egypts are impermeable to argument or reason on this score. Most civilians who have dealt with Brit in past with any attempts at understanding are now under arrest.

It is not pleasant to have men long on extremism and short on admin experience such at Fathi Radwan and Mureddin Tarraf in the Cab or a rep of the Ikhwan such as Bakkury. On other hand Bakkury is from more moderate section of Brotherhood and Radwan and Tarraf are only 2 of 16. I had previously indicated personal objection to the inclusion of Sanhoury (a signer of Stockholm peace appeal)² or of Commie Barawi and mil honored my objects and left them out. The carry-over of MinFin Emary is a good sign and others are gen moderates.

Mil this morn tell us their full program (remytel 596)³ will be published within few days.

CAFFERY

¹ Repeated to London as telegram 205 and unnumbered to Paris, Ankara, Rome, Moscow, Tehran, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, the Arab capitals, and Tangier.

² For documentation on the Stockholm peace appeal and other matters related to the Soviet "Peace Offensive", see *Foreign Relations, 1950*, vol. iv, pp. 261 ff.

³ See footnote 3, *supra*.