

2. Strong British popular reaction against US recognition of title.
3. Impairment of United States position in Egypt and the Arab States if the approach fails and United States support is given to the United Kingdom.
4. Further commitment of United States equipment and facilities.
5. United States would be unpopular with large sections of the Sudanese opinion.
6. "Last-gasp" nature of approach.

In summation, probably the biggest difficulty for the United Kingdom would be to agree to United States recognition of Farouk's title. In any event, should the UK agree to this approach, it is extremely doubtful that Egypt would consider the price high enough, even at the risk of offending the US. However, it is believed that there are sufficient possibilities in the approach to take soundings with Ambassadors Caffery and Gifford.

Recommendation

That you approve the proposed new approach for the purpose of consultation with Ambassadors Caffery and Gifford.

No. 996

641.74/7-2252: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

LONDON, July 23, 1952—6 p. m.

407. In Eden's continued absence, I saw Strang this morning and, in accordance Deptel 460 July 22,² outlined Dept's suggestions contained Deptel 437, July 19 re msg from Eden or Churchill to Hilali and Mahdi. I emphasized that if Brit were willing take this action, we for our part wld be willing urge Hilali accept it in spirit in which it was sent and do our utmost move him away from extreme position. In putting suggestion to Strang I particularly recalled Eden's statement to Secy that what Brit want is Sudanese decision on title which wld be as close as possible to what Egypt desires.

Strang confirmed Eden's statement represents UK desire. He said FonOff wld give careful consideration our suggestion re msg

¹ Repeated to Cairo as telegram 22.

² In telegram 460, July 22, not printed, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in London to act on Department telegram 437 (Document 993) in view of the fact that Hilali had just been reappointed Prime Minister. The Department believed that a personal message from either Eden or Churchill to Hilali would be most useful and might give him needed support. (745W.00/7-2252)