

military point of view, it must be recalled that the invitation to Egypt to join the Middle East Command was based on the calculated risk of Egypt's good faith and intentions and not on the presence of large numbers of foreign forces.

With respect to the use of force to maintain the British position, the implications of this course of action in terms of the British as well as the entire Western position in the Middle East are so serious that the British should be left in no doubt that we cannot in any way accept this as the alternative to failure to find a settlement. It is true that use of force may be necessary under certain conditions but to select it *a priori* as a course of action would be contrary to United States principles, objectives and interests.

*Recommendation:*

That you speak to the British Ambassador along the lines of the attached paper (Tab E) <sup>6</sup> which you may wish to hand him as a record of your statement.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

No. 992

641.74/7-1652 Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt* <sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1952—7:07 p. m.

83. Secy saw Brit Amb Jul 14 at latter's request. Amb said he had been instructed reinforce Eden's request contained Deptel 41 Jul 8 to Cairo. <sup>2</sup> Amb also showed Secy tel from FonOff replying to views expressed by Dept Reps on Jul 7 (Deptel 40 Jul 8 to Cairo). <sup>3</sup> FonOff considered that Brit consultation with Sudanese undesirable and believed it preferable await creation Sudanese legislative bodies.

<sup>1</sup> Also sent to London as telegram 321. Drafted and approved by Stabler.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 40 to Cairo, July 8, not printed, the Department of State informed Ambassador Caffery not only of the British Embassy's comments which accompanied the delivery of Eden's request as reported in Department telegram 41 but also provided Caffery with a summary of the views expressed to British Embassy officials by the Department's representatives. The Department's analysis was that Hilali fell due to his lack of progress with the British; the Department's representatives again urged the British to consult with the Sudanese; they said that the United States strongly hoped to avoid a situation whereby the British could maintain their position in Egypt only by using force; and they declared that the Department seriously questioned the wisdom of intervening in Egypt in the fashion suggested by Foreign Secretary Eden. (641.74/7-852)