ring the matter to ICJ but I feel he would consider that an unsatisfactory and unnecessary delaying procedure.

He said he had presented the IG case to Soviet Ambassador much as he had to the British Ambassador and me. He had done so because the Soviets are permanent members of the Security Council. He said, in confidence, he had talked as strongly and emphatically as he could in an effort to prevent a repetition of the Soviet veto to the New Zealand resolution on Suez transit early this year. He pointed out to the Ambassador the similarity in Soviet interest in principle involved in Suez and through Dardanelles. He received no impression or indication of Soviet reaction to his present request.

He expressed the very great hope that the U.S. would support the IG. I replied that I would report to my government this conversation, the several points he had emphasized and the very great importance he attached to the matter and to the benefits of effective support on our part. ²

LAWSON

No. 924

784A.53/11-2954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 1, 1954—11:15 a.m. 841. FYI Israel Amb informed Byroade that although Chairman EIMAC has appealed for immediate release Bat Galim and crew, IG has no indication so far Egypt has moved comply. Israel believes parties should respect implications MAC decisions as Israel respected UNTSO orders in past (Huleh Marshes and Banat Yaqub). Requested US assistance inside or outside UN on release Bat Galim

and upholding SC resolution Sept 1, 1951. Byroade replied while

² Telegram 730 from Cairo, Dec. 3, reported that in recent conversations with an Embassy officer, several Egyptian Foreign Office officials had taken the line that the present case in the Security Council, which concerned the passage of Israeli flagships through the ?anal, was entirely different from the 1951 Security Council case which only related to the passage of goods.

[&]quot;Foreign Office officials have also stated categorically that, all other considerations aside, it is politically impossible for GOE to allow an Israeli flagship to transit Canal at this juncture. To do so would be catastrophic they say for RCC not only internally, but also in respect relations other Arab states whose Foreign Ministers presently gathered here in AL session are already aroused over Jerusalem credentials matter." (9844.53/12-254)

¹ Sent also to New York; repeated to Tel Aviv and London.