

4. What inducements from the US, UK or other outside countries would be most effective in the country of assignment? If economic or military aid is recommended, general estimates of the magnitude and duration would be helpful.

5. The usefulness of endeavoring to move forward simultaneously on area defense arrangements.

a. How could efforts in this field most effectively assist in progress towards an Arab-Israel settlement.

DULLES

No. 923

984A.53/11-3054: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Israel (Lawson) to the Department of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

TEL AVIV, November 30, 1954—8 p. m.

470. Prime Minister called British, French and myself independently to Jerusalem today to request three governments support of IG position in *Bat Galim* case before SC. He emphasized strongly very great importance SC decision to IG. After reviewing conditions of case, and particularly decision and final report of MAC to SC the Prime Minister described the proposed IG procedure as follows:

IG will endeavor to have SC pass resolution strongly and clearly defining rights of freedom of Suez passage for ships all flags and basing resolution specifically on *Bat Galim* case. This to be new resolution and not merely refer to September 1, 1951 resolution which Egypt has completely ignored in past. He felt that resolution reiterating terms of ignored 1951 resolution would be completely ineffective as Egyptians would grant it little respect in view of past experience. He is convinced that only clear, precise and strong resolution based on *Bat Galim* case and on principles clearly involved will settle basic issue and permit Israeli flagships pass unhindered through Suez in conduct Israeli foreign trade—an international right which should not be denied Israel alone among all nations.

He claimed that decision on this important principle clearly a responsibility of SC and was so recognized by its resolution September 1, 1951.

He said US Government had specific responsibilities as (a) permanent member SC, (b) as supporter September 1951 resolution, and (c) because of special relations with Egypt, especially economic

¹ Sent in two sections; repeated to Cairo, London, and Paris.