

it be threatened as a result of U.S. efforts, which would be limited in scope, to strengthen the area. Mr. Eban said that Israel felt she could presently resist Arab attack but that her position now was one of minimum equilibrium which could be easily disrupted. It would be most helpful if what the Secretary had said regarding the magnitude of U.S. military aid could be said publicly to Israel.

Mr. Eban stated he had received reports to the effect that U.S. efforts to bring Egypt and Iraq into satisfactory defense arrangements had been unsuccessful. Mr. Byroade replied that he felt progress was being made. Mr. Byroade continued that for the U.S. to agree to the balance of power would mean that the entire area would have to be kept as weak as one of its states. He felt that the best approach for lasting reassurances to Israel was to chip away at the differences between Israel and her neighbors. For example, arrangements might be made whereby Egypt would relax her blockade of Israel if Israel were to take positive steps on other things—one such example might be compensation of the Arab refugees. Mr. Eban indicated Israel's readiness to take measures looking toward peace. However, Israel could not take effective action along these lines until U.S. assurances of the type he sought were forthcoming. It was not necessary for the U.S. to guarantee a mechanical balance of power. The U.S. should, however, say, formally and publicly, that it does not intend to introduce major changes in the present situation. This would create a profitable atmosphere for further moves toward peace.

The Secretary stated that he would look into the possibilities of recasting some of the language of the draft under discussion. He indicated that he would be out of Washington for a period and suggested that Mr. Eban pursue the matter with the Under Secretary and Mr. Byroade.

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*The Israeli Ambassador (Eban) to the Secretary of State*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
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WASHINGTON, 8 October 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The situation is so grave after our conversation today that I take the liberty of addressing my personal reflections to you even before consultation with my Government.

Our talk today was a most serious setback and disappointment. All the positive ideas which you expressed in your previous three