

areas along the border (which you have noted in Tel Aviv's 268 of September 15)<sup>1</sup> is a case in point.

Given the lack of French and British enthusiasm, it is felt that it would be best not to pursue the matter with them until we have something in the nature of a concrete proposal for a second *démarche*. We feel that we need field comment and guidance before attempting to draft such a proposal.

*Recommendation*

That you sign the attached telegram to the field.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Sent as telegram 173 to Tel Aviv, *infra*.

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No. 896

684A.85/9-2154: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 21, 1954—12:55 p. m.

173. Dept's instruction CA-6175 April 28 and subsequent correspondence relative eleven tripartite proposals for measures case tension Israel-Jordan armistice line.

Dept now considering detailed discussions with French and British re possible second *démarche* to IC and HKJ re tripartite proposals. Before launching discussions telegraphed views of addressees are needed as to utility, timing, and content such second *démarche*. Dept disturbed at apparent tendency Israelis look upon measures designed strengthen UNTSO machinery as infringement Israel sovereignty (Tel Aviv's 268).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sent also to Amman as telegram 123, and to Jerusalem as 33; sent by pouch to London, Paris, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.