

tion in steps which Secretary and Chargé had informed IG we were giving attention to—to improve prospects of peace and Israel's security. Neither Prime Minister nor Eban had conveyed to Israel public the sentiments which Prime Minister had previously expressed to me; on contrary, attempt made to undermine our position. I said we had received from responsible quarters intelligence to effect Israel would make attack on Jordan during maneuvers; that Embassy had recommended against an approach to IG on ground it was difficult to believe IDF would make attack in midst of extraordinary efforts toward peace we were undertaking; that incidentally Embassy's ability to convey convincing assurances of IG's cooperative intentions had, of course, been impaired. Prime Minister expressed his regret at latter; said he "did not know who was responsible for Beit Liqya". He hinted clearly, without actually saying, that attack carried out by IDF, without his knowledge, in order forestall increase of pro-Herut sentiment following attacks during previous weeks on two Herut settlements.

RUSSELL

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*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Israel-Jordan Affairs (Bergus)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 15, 1954.

Subject: Israel Proposals for U.S. Measures of Reassurance.

Participants: The Secretary

Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr.

Ambassador Abba Eban of Israel

Minister Reuven Shiloah of Israel

NEA—Mr. Byroade

NE—Mr. Bergus

Ambassador Eban opened the conversation by stating that he had found within the Israel Government and among the public there a sense of "isolation, vulnerability and insecurity". The leaders of the Israel Government had felt unable to attempt to calm public fears inasmuch as they themselves shared these feelings of apprehension. The Israel Government had considered the Secretary's remarks of August 7 and Mr. Eban was now fully authorized to say that his Government felt there were certain measures which the U.S. could take to allay this apprehension.