

in order to meet a transitory manifestation of Israeli emotionalism, we should be placed in the position of losing ground which we have so laboriously won in respect of the Arabs: Particularly since it would appear that we are not, in fact, faced by an immediate crisis requiring hasty action.²

HARE

² In telegram 254 from Cairo, Aug. 25, 2 p. m., Caffery stated:

"I should like to associate myself with the views set forth by Ambassador Hare in Beirut's telegram No. 171 Aug. 21 to Department. Although not written in reply to Department circular telegram 108 Aug. 21 observation contained therein are pertinent to questions raised Department's telegram.

"It seems to me furthermore that any major decision affecting US policy in Near East should be carefully considered in the light of our over-all relations with the area. I assume therefore that Department will wish to defer consideration of moves with regard to Israel until more is known about results recent Iraqi-Egypt discussions." (684A.86/8-2554)

No. 867

684A.86/8-2154: Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1954—4:33 p. m.

108. General developments in Middle East, including Egyptian and Iranian agreements, lead us to hope we may have opportunity establish far better working understanding with area in general, and Arab states in particular. Unfortunately, as other long-standing problems reduced, Arab-Israel dispute looms larger as impediment to constructive efforts in Middle East. We currently searching for ways, in absence of peace which will not be readily forthcoming, to move forward with general strengthening of area and at same time assure that our actions will not precipitate hostilities within area.

If basis for cooperation with Arab states in area defense arrangements can be established as now seems probable, point would be reached eventually where imbalance both in military strength and confidence would exist between Arab states and Israel adverse to latter. This is inevitable if we are to succeed over period of years creating real strength. Limiting our objective to simply balancing Arab strength with Israel strength would mean defeat of overall objective.

¹ Sent to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Tehran.