

efforts mutually concentrated upon second course, no reason why they should not remain close and firm, though Israel would have to understand necessity of our working closely with Arabs and would have to have confidence in US intentions during period pattern was evolving. ³

RUSSELL

³ On July 27, Russell suggested further that at his meeting with Sharett on Friday, July 30, he refer to increasing public discussion in recent months of the possibility that Israel might adopt a policy of aggression, and say that the development of such a policy would, of course, have the gravest consequences for the relations of the two countries. (Telegram 95 from Tel Aviv, July 27, 2 p. m.; 683.84A:322/7-2754)

No. 845

784A.5/7-2854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1954--5:43 p. m.

46. Dept approves general lines exposition set forth Embtels 91 ¹ and 95 ² with following qualifications:

While alteration relative arms strength NE countries may result from Western policies over next decade to extent Israel may not continue dominate area militarily, no intention increase Arab capabilities to point where Israel's security threatened. Would not be in US or free world interest induce conflagration in area it endeavoring stabilize vis-à-vis Soviet.

No reference should be made reaffirmation or expansion Tripartite Declaration.

Suggest inclusion appropriate points Eytan statement Embtel 88 ³ in list references Embtel 95. May be useful contrast confidence which USG has placed in Israel, on basis which USG has assisted Israel economically and politically, with most disappointing lack reciprocal trust on part Israel.

Assume you will cover points re Banat Ya'qub Deptel 41. ⁴

DULLES

¹ *Supra.*

² See footnote 3, *supra.*

³ Telegram 88 from Tel Aviv, July 26, not printed, summarized a radio address delivered on July 25 by Walter Eytan concerning Israel's attitude toward the possible British evacuation of Suez. (641.71/7-2654)

⁴ Document 843.