

was informed United States hoped France would associate itself with Amman *démarche* which would be undertaken without delay following Ambassador Mallory's return from Istanbul (therefore probably May 19, 20, or 22).

Department made clear: (1) it did not expect early action in Security Council on border situation due procedural wrangle re Jordan's presence at Security Council meetings and other factors and therefore felt further delay in *démarche* Amman unwise; (2) certain measures would not necessarily require Arab-Israeli agreement (Department telegram 4070); and (3) Department favored informal secret approach by United Kingdom Ambassador speaking for all three.

DULLES

agreed that discussions should probably be conducted on the basis of "pooling" ideas of both sides, giving Jordan every encouragement and opportunity to present its own suggestions. (684A/85/5-1354)

No. 827

684A.85/5-2454: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Jordan (Mallory) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

AMMAN, May 24, 1954—2 p. m.

480. Re Deptel 443. ² British Ambassador Duke made *démarche* to Foreign Minister Saturday, May 22 and subsequently to Prime Minister. I informed Foreign Minister we fully associated ourselves with British *démarche* and deeply felt necessity of achieving relaxations of tensions on border. Foreign Minister surprisingly informed me he submitting question to Jordan Cabinet today. Minister from standpoint of national policy stated his desire for quiet on the border and necessity of breathing space for new government which inherited difficult public opinion (see also Embtel 463). ³ Seeing Foreign Minister again Wednesday. ⁴

MALLORY

¹ Repeated to Tel Aviv and London.

² Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Ambassador Mallory forwarded, under cover of despatch 408 from Amman, May 27, a memorandum of his conversation with Ambassador Duke concerning the latter's approach to the Jordanian Government. Mallory also forwarded memoranda of his own conversations with the Jordanian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister (on May 24 and 27 respectively) in which he formally stated that the United States associated itself with the British *démarche*. (684A.85/5-2654) The 11 points of the British *démarche* to Jordan were not specifically described in these memoranda of conversation.

Continued