7. Any conversations with UN on measures affecting assistance to UNTSO should await outcome talks with Jordan and Israel.

**DULLES** 

## No. 822

684A.86/5-1254

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart)

SECRET

[Washington,] May 12, 1954.

Subject: Developing Seriousness of Arab-Israel Tensions.

Participants: Mr. Jacob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

Parker T. Hart, Director, NE

Mr. Blaustein introduced himself to the Secretary as a non-Zionist who has helped Israel, President of the American Jewish Committee and head of Amoco (oil company). He wished the Secretary to know that he had had a talk with the President and that it was the President's suggestion that he call on the Secretary. Normally, he would not have requested such an interview without first consulting Mr. Byroade, now at Istanbul. He had been a strong supporter of the Administration's policy in the Near East but he wished to express his apprehension that the "impartial policy" was going a little far in certain respects. The Secretary had himself sought peace between Israel and the Arab states during his last year's visit to the Near East and had discovered that this could not be brought about at that time. However, he hoped that the U.S. Government would not play down the concept of peace but unremittingly seek it by every means, since he felt that the tensions between Israel and the Arab states were now greater than ever before. He did not agree with the Israel reaction to Mr. Byroade's recent speeches and had so informed the Israel Embassy. The Israelis were prone to find fault with an entire address which contained five good points but also one which they did not like. Nevertheless, Mr. Blaustein was concerned that our arms aid to Iraq, plus the tenor of recent statements by the Administration, were giving rise to a cocksureness and intransigence among the Arab countries. He felt that he knew the Arabs well enough to be sure that you could not afford to give them too much encouragement. Arms to Iraq, he felt sure, would encourage Arab intransigence and it was more likely that these arms would be used against Israel, or even ulti-