

Initially only Jordan and Israel would be approached, although British realize HKJ may consult other Arab governments and other aspects Israel-Arab situation may be brought in.

ALDRICH

 No. 808

684A.85/4-2154 Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris ¹

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1954—3:04 p. m.

Tosec 8. We agree with British suggestions as set forth London's 636 to Paris ² for separate approaches to Jordan and Israel by tripartite powers and with proposed tactics. In face of Soviet obstructionism and Arab opposition to meeting between parties, we also are not sanguine as to constructive results from SC proceedings. However since we still exploring what may be done in SC we believe we should postpone decision on timing of approach until course SC discussions becomes clearer. In interim three powers could usefully clarify among themselves their views on concrete measures which might be taken and on terms in which approach to Jordan and Israel should be made.

If you concur you may wish to discuss with Eden and Bidault along above lines.

SMITH

¹ Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, and Amman.

² Printed as telegram 4636 from London, *supra.*

 No. 809

684A.85/4-2554 Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State ¹

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, April 25, 1954—2 p. m.

1348. Re Tel Aviv telegram 1071. ² Riad told Embassy officer yesterday he or Gohar prepared meet Israelis opposite number any time for informal discussion border problems with or without local commanders and police participation and in presence UN observer.

¹ Repeated to Tel Aviv as telegram 74.

² Document 798.