

Gaza April 15 by UN plane if no new incidents. Meanwhile he is recalling Colonel Gohar to take over his work during his absence at Damascus April 18 meeting. Riad said agreements might be reached which would stop major incidents for month or so but could never stop "individual incidents" (i.e. thefts and exchanges of fire across line). He asserted Egyptian retaliations were civilian while Israeli retaliations are organized either by IG or border settlers over whom IG has little or no control. He denied any similarity to situation on Jordan border and concluded it is not matter of agreements of which there are plenty, but of sincere cooperation.

CAFFERY

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No. 794

684A.8674-1354: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

LONDON, April 13, 1954—1 a. m.

Secto 4. For Acting Secretary from the Secretary. In morning meeting April 12 with Eden we discussed at length Israeli-Arab situation. Kirkpatrick, Roger Allen and Shuckburgh present. Ambassador Aldrich, Butterworth and Merchant with me.

Eden said King of Jordan angry at British over his recent statement in Commons to which he had refused to add new gloss.

I said that I was deeply disturbed over situation in Middle East and that I feared Israel may calculate that matters cannot improve until they become worse. Conditions under the armistice are unsatisfactory with Israel treated as an enemy, blockaded, etc. I said that inference could be drawn from Israeli acts that they were prepared to reopen war in order to create situation from which peace settlement rather than armistice would follow. The Arabs for their part, I said, were fearful of a new attack. A new factor in situation was weight now being thrown behind Arabs by Soviets as witnessed to by their recent vetoes. All of this meant that the area with its immense oil reserves were in increasing jeopardy. I concluded by saying that these events were not likely to happen in near future. It was entirely possible that in year or two they would come to pass and that it was difficult to know with certainty the proper course of action for us to follow. I expressed doubt that by US following more balanced policy in area, we could count on so increasing our influence with Arab states as to promote stability and harmonious relations.