

encouragement of Soviet veto could have unfortunate consequences for Syria. Though Soviet veto under these circumstances may appear to uphold Syria's position this may well assure that no resolution will be passed. In this case it is almost certain Israelis will start work on project again, a development which would be highly damaging to interests of all concerned.

4. Embassy Beirut should, if it believes useful purpose would be served, make similar approach to President Chamoun.

DULLES

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No. 765

884A.85322/1-1254: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Syria (Moose) to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY      DAMASCUS, January 12, 1954—7 p. m.

271. Embassy telegram 268, January 1 [9], 1954. Sense paragraph 2, Deptel 281, January 11, communicated Zeineddine today. He said he had persuaded Shishakli, after long conversation Sunday night, to approve Zeineddine's proposed changes in draft Banat Yacub resolution. Zeineddine added that GOS desired find agreed resolution and would suggest other "basis for agreement" if his current proposals unacceptable tripartite powers. He neither referred Russian aid nor reiterated earlier statement (Embassy telegram 268) that Soviet veto preferable adoption tripartite draft.

*Comment:* Striking contrast between Zeineddine's comments before and after seeing Shishakli suggests Syrian President exercised moderating influence on his Ambassador.

MOOSE

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<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, London, Paris, Moscow, Baghdad, Amman, Jidda, Jerusalem, and New York; to be passed to the Department of Defense.