

Nations Headquarters in New York, where it would pursue its efforts to solve the questions of compensation for the Palestine refugees and the release of Arab refugee bank accounts in Israel. (U.N. doc. A/2629)

No. 762

684A.83922/1-954 Telegram

*The Ambassador in Syria (Moose) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

DAMASCUS, January 9, 1954—9 p. m.

268. In discussing Israeli diversion project today, Ambassador Zeineddine forcefully presented Syrian arguments against three-power resolution as tabled. Declared Arab delegations regarded SC action on this question more important than that on Qibya massacre because tripartite draft attempts to alter terms of armistice agreement and vote will provide indication of future Western attitude.

Describing Russian motives as different from those of Arabs, Zeineddine professed reluctance utilize Russian aid. Nevertheless he asserted USSR would vote with Arabs "on this and other Palestine questions" and predicted disregard for Syrian "rights" under armistice agreement would lead to defeat of tripartite draft either by majority vote or by Russian veto. He states Arabs considered Russian veto with its dangerous and unpredictable consequences preferable to adoption tripartite text.

Shishakli's absence (Embtel 265, January 9)² has prevented Zeineddine from seeing him but Zeineddine expects discuss his proposed changes in draft resolution with the Syrian President shortly and hopes obtain official approval.

MOOSE

¹ Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, Moscow, Baghdad, Beirut, Amman, Jidda, Jerusalem.

² Telegram 265 from Damascus, Jan. 9, not printed, reported in part that Shishakli had been vacationing since Jan. 1, his longest absence from Damascus for the past 2 years. As a result of his absence, a rumor was circulating (apparently originating from his opposition) that he was suffering from a paralysis. (783.11/1-954)