

use conference merely as means of putting Jordan in bad light by making sweeping proposals, it certain to fail. Embassy Tel Aviv should emphasize following to GOI:

Usefulness Israel suggestion will depend on manner presentation, modesty Israel's objectives, and existing political climate. We hope conference will be productive concrete results and we will use our influence to that end, to extent practicable. It would be unwise for Israel to exert pressure which would embarrass Government of Jordan with its own people and force it into intransigent position. We believe Israel's best course is to strive only for limited, and therefore possibly attainable, objectives.

All addressees please urgently report local reaction to Israeli proposal.

DULLES

No. 740

684A.85/11-2653: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Lebanon (Hare) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

BEIRUT, November 26, 1953—3 a. m.

473. Our views on Israel-Jordan conference on armistice agreement (Department telegram 591 November 24)² communicated this morning to Foreign Minister who said our position seemed logical and he appreciated being informed of it in as much as he anticipated exchange of views between Arab Governments prior to reply by Jordan. In fact, he said Jordan Ambassador was at moment of my call waiting to see him, presumably on this very subject. Foreign Minister said that as soon as definite decision reached he would let us know. He indicated that his own thinking favored acceptance by Jordan attend meeting while at same time taking appropriate safeguards to prevent Israel from making inappropriate use of conference.

Foreign Minister also expressed general approval of resolution on Qibya and said that Malik had been instructed to vote in his discretion in favor or to abstain, but not vote against. Malik had decided to abstain.

HARE

¹ Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

² Printed as telegram 231 to Amman, *supra*.