

2. He was interested in (a) military aid, (b) our help in liquidating DZ's, (c) other economic aid. He insisted however that these matters were entirely separate from the Jordan Valley development plan. While undoubtedly recognizing our willingness to cooperate in other measures as *quid pro quo* of Jordan Valley cooperation on his part he refused to accept it as such at this time. He agreed discuss these three matters with Moose however while at same time considering final position on Jordan plan.

3. He had not studied the TVA plan nor had any of his engineers but from what he had seen of it he was not pleased. He feels that it disregards Syria's legitimate rights and took position that Syria had right to half of the waters of the Jordan between Huleh and Tiberias. Also mentioned possibility of diverting Banias before confluence with Jordan. We assured him that reasonable modifications of plan were possible provided they were economic and did not involve the wastage of precious water merely to keep it from someone else who could use it economically.

4. He was not impressed by the suggestion that the TVA plan could be accepted by the several parties through unilateral declarations instead of multi-lateral agreement.

*Comment:* At least the door is open. Even more than in Jordan I encountered a disposition to premise future action upon the correction of past alleged injustice.

Shishakli wants US economic and military cooperation but seemingly not at the price of having to cooperate with US in any step indicative of *rapprochement* with Israel. While the political unreality of his position re partition, refugees, and other matters previously covered by UN resolutions may be apparent to us it is also apparent that stern political realities here make it difficult for him to take any other attitude. The crack in the door may be widened but it will take a great deal of persuasion and pressure to do it.

MOOSE

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No. 721

120.280/11-353 Telegram

*The Ambassador in Lebanon (Hare) to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

BEIRUT, November 3, 1953—4 p. m.

400. From Johnston. Conferred lengthily November 2 with President Chamoun, Prime Minister Yafi and President Chamber Deputies Osseiran and on November 3 with Foreign Minister Naccache.<sup>2</sup> Received cordially by all with clear evidence of interest.

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 403 from Beirut, Nov. 4, contained the following report from Johnston:

*Continued*