

that it would be mistake for members of his government not to permit Johnston to explain new plan and meeting tentatively arranged for October 24.

Johnston then explained US position re Jordan waters at some length. I believe Prime Minister very favorably impressed but he was obviously worried about reactions his Cabinet colleagues.

LYNCH

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No. 705

120.280/10-2153: Telegrams

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Égypt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1953—5:24 p. m.

469. Department endorses fully position taken by Hare as reported Beirut's 360.<sup>2</sup> Arab leaders now possess opportunity, which may not recur, demonstrate constructive approach both re Johnston Mission and Security Council consideration area tensions.

As Arabs must realize, US has taken strong line on Qibya incident and by withholding aid to Israel in connection by Banat Yaqub construction has shown its intention back UN by concrete action.

Attitude taken by certain Arab leaders toward Johnston Mission, including credulity given fabrications regarding his Zionist sympathies (facts set forth Deptel 172<sup>3</sup> and Paris Embtel 8 to Amman),<sup>4</sup> together with tendency adopt unconstructive attitude towards issues before Security Council can only damage Arab position before US and world opinion. Department assumed that in accordance with their own best traditions Arab Government would accord courteous receptions to representative of President and would give

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<sup>1</sup> Sent also to Baghdad, Jidda, Amman, Damascus, and Beirut; repeated to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 360 from Beirut, Oct. 21, Ambassador Hare reported on a conversation with Foreign Minister Naccache in which he stressed Johnston's impartiality and the importance of the mission, read the Department's press statement of Oct. 18, and called attention to the U.S. Government's intention to see those responsible for the Qibya incident brought to account. "In conclusion," Hare reported, "I told Foreign Minister that despite gravity present situation in Near East, there is in actuality an opportunity for progress highly beneficial to Arabs, an opportunity which if lost may not recur. I emphasized necessity for Arab leaders show understanding and take constructive approach since contrary action would only be to their detriment." (120.280/10-2153)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 172 to Amman is the same as telegram 140 to Damascus, Oct. 17; not printed, but see footnote 5, Document 693.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 8 from Paris to Amman is the same as telegram 1519 from Paris to the Department; not printed, but see *ibid.*