

No. 543

310.5/1-1653: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Department of State*

[Extract]

SECRET · US ROUTINE · NEW YORK, January 16, 1953—9:46 p. m.
425. Daily Classified summary No. 130.

Palestine

Rafael (Israel), who expects to return to Israel for reassignment at the close of the second part of the GA, told USUN Jan. 16 he had been asked to become a kind of "high commissioner for peace" in the Middle East, with the overall task of directing the new peace initiative. In his view, the Israel Government was in much stronger position now to formulate and carry through concrete plans for settling matters with the Arab governments.

In general, Rafael said, their program would follow the lines of Eban's (Israel) blueprint for peace as put forward during the GA debate. Plans had been worked out to a certain point in the FonOff and now required inter-departmental consideration.

Rafael stated he would not accept the proffered assignment until he knew what the final program would be. The FonOff thinking was that an over-all plan should be developed to cover every element in the total ME picture, each question to be approached from the standpoint of practical, beneficial appeal to the Arabs' self-interest, and each to be related to the others.

Specifically, Rafael continued, the blueprint would include the problems of compensation to Arab refugees and territorial adjustments. On both, they hoped now to go beyond the principles involved and set forth detailed propositions.

—Hopes for consultations with US—

Once discussions in the government had reached a concrete form, Rafael hoped consultations could begin with the US. Agreement between the two governments on a program and the implementing measures seemed to him essential to success.

Meanwhile, Rafael hoped the PCC would lie low. He questioned, therefore, the advisability of the PCC sending a communication to the Arab states as had been done last year. This might provoke embarrassing requests from the Arabs which would prejudice later action on the Israeli peace program. He suggested letters to the parties be deferred at least until the end of the GA.