

common ground so that neither side violently opposed what the Assembly finally adopted. We could expect, therefore, an extreme Arab draft resolution from which they could move toward a compromise. Alternatively, the Arabs might introduce their extreme ideas as amendments to the six-power draft. It was generally felt, in the Assembly, that there was little use in passing something which one side or the other vehemently opposed.

[Here follows a short discussion of the situation in Korea.]

The Delegation meeting then adjourned.

CHARLES D. COOK

No. 527

683.84A/11-2852: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Syria (Moose) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

DAMASCUS, November 28, 1952—4 p. m.

386. Tel Aviv tel 779 to Dept Nov 13. Emb does not accept implication reftel that progress toward area stability and attainment mutually satisfactory Syro-Israel *modus vivendi* only possible if Syria envisions negots as directed toward peace. Proposal divide demil zone on *de facto* basis (Embtel 345, Nov 6) wld, if adopted, increase area stability by reducing Syro-Israel border tensions, and wld also build confidence for future more general arrangements. Wld not satisfy main Israel aims, but only way ultimately reestablish Syro-Israel peace and commercial relations is by several successive steps of which creation *de facto* frontier wld appear to be first. As such, *modus vivendi* wld be step toward peace whether or not so regarded by Syrians.

Initiative now with Israel for renewal contacts fol Oct 9 mtg (Embtel 354, Nov 12).

MOOSE

¹ Repeated to Tel Aviv, Paris, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, London, Rome, Ankara, and Jidda.