

plan of work which will obviate or minimize damage to agric lands in Syria. If both sides can be induced concentrate first on settlement latter problem without ref to fundamental legal differences between them, some progress may be possible.

Declared readiness GOI undertake secret discussion at high level on Syria-Israel relations, by implication including possible adjustment demarcation line, may have resulted from direct intervention by FonMin (Embtel 1164, May 7). It is hoped that full advantage will be taken of opportunity negot on above point, which it will be recalled Israel FonMin was unwilling discuss last year apart from discussion covering all outstanding questions (Embtel 2 July 3, 1951).²

DAVIS

² For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, p. 1100.

No. 438

974.5301/4-2452 Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1952—5:58 p. m.

443. Re Suez. Urtel 736, Apr 24.

1. We believe element which shld govern any actions at this stage re Suez blockade is course of Anglo-Egyptian negots. Accordingly, we do not believe Suez restriction problem shld be raised while Anglo-Egyptian conversations continue and there is some hope for settlement. We understand UK Del has been instructed by London this sense.

2. In view of above it is clear that of the alternatives suggested by Eban only the first can be considered at this time, namely that we leave matters as they are. We have repeatedly emphasized to Eban and other Israelis that we have Suez restriction problem much in mind and that we share Israel's desire to have restrictions removed. We have no intention of ignoring or forgetting Sept 1, 1951 SC Res. However we believe raising matter at this time undoubtedly wld have a most prejudicial effect on Anglo-Egyptian talks.

3. Shld occasion require that you discuss second and third alternatives we suggest that fol may be helpful:

¹ Repeated by air pouch to London, Paris, Cairo, Ankara, and Tel Aviv.