

Paris,<sup>3</sup> Israel appears determined (Tel Aviv Embtel 799 Feb 6)<sup>4</sup> raise this issue in relatively near future, as least with US and UK. Public discussion matter might constitute new emotional element which wld work against overall solution of problems with Egypt since US and others who voted for res wld be compelled reaffirm position they took in SC if pressed on this matter. We continue believe present time highly inappropriate for Israel to air this question and will so inform Israel reps Wash. Emb Tel Aviv authd reiterate to Israel Govt Dept position as stated Gadel 853.

2. Request comment missions concerned re desirability making fol approach Egypt Govt:

Ideal solution for this problem wld be for it to quietly disappear through Egyptian action as part of gen lowering of temperatures. Maher Govt did not institute restrictions on Israel-bound ships. On sound basis of Egypt's internal responsibilities vis-à-vis Canal, Egypt Govt cld quietly lift these restrictions. If this were done we wld strongly urge Israel in its own interest not to crow about it as victory over Arabs. If Maher Govt is taking new and realistic look at Egypt's internatl position we wld think that restrictions on ships bound for Israel through Canal wld be one of first things it wld wish to rectify.

ACHESON

<sup>3</sup> Document 394.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

## No. 400

320.2AA/2-852: Telegram

### *The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1952—8:39 p. m.

715. Ref: Deptels Amman 49 (rpted Beirut as 161) August 16, 1951; <sup>2</sup> Deptel Beirut 208, August 30; <sup>3</sup> Legtel Beirut 194 August

<sup>1</sup> Identified also as telegram Unrap 231; repeated to Damascus as telegram 315, and to Tel Aviv as 560.

<sup>2</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, p. 837.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 208 to Beirut, Aug. 30, 1951 (identified also as telegram Unrap 188), the Department stated (in response to telegram 194 from Beirut, Aug. 28, described in footnote 4 below) its doubt that the Israeli Government was in a position to claim that the Jordanian development of the Yarmuk River was a hostile act, but considered that a political agreement on this question, as well as on other problems relating to the Jordan water system, should be reached by Israel and the interested Arab states prior to developments undertaken by either side. The Department was agreeable to any solution satisfactory to both Israel and the Arab states, but believed the

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