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## OIR CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 30-54: MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE

## CONCLUSIONS

- 1. Prospects for the development of effective defense of the Middle East against a major aggressor are only slightly more favorable now than in 1951 and 1952, the dates of the unsuccessful MEC and MEDO proposals.
- 2. The Turk-Pakistani agreement providing for defense consultation as an initial step toward regional defense, attempts to overcome one obstacle to previous attempts to set up regional defense—namely, an over-emphasis on Western initiative and direction. In addition, the possibility of substantial MDAP assistance without ostensible "strings" offers a new feature in the situation since all of the states in the area desire to improve or expand their military establishments. Despite these potentially favorable factors, however, there 0are serious obstacles to be surmounted before a wider regional defense system can be brought into being.
- 3 Iran and Afghanistan are unlikely to risk joining any Middle East defense arrangement until it has shown sufficient strength to provide them immediately with a fair degree of protection.
- 4. The adherence of Iraq to the Turk-Pakistani pact is problematic since it depends on the strength and nature of internal as well as external opposition, with time apparently working to reduce the prospect of adherence. An important variable, however, will be the timing, scope and nature of MDAP assistance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The source text was the first section of a 40-page paper prepared in OIR. No drafter was listed on the text. The rest of the paper consisted of sections on the background of a Middle East defense organization, the attitudes of other states toward adherence to the Turkish-Pakistan agreement, the prospects for development of a formal regional defense organization, the probable attitudes of other countries toward a formal regional defense organization, and the probable consequences of developments in Middle East defense.

The "conclusions" section was attached to a memorandum by Fritzlan to Hart, dated May 14, not printed (780.5/5-1454), which disagreed with a number of statements in the paper. For a more formal statement of disagreement, see the paper approved by the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul, May 14, entitled "Conference Statement on Middle East Defense Commenting on OIR Contribution to NIE 30-54, May 3, 1954," Document 212. NIE 30-54, June 22, is printed as Document